# Portland City Council Finance & Governance Committee (Whole) 10/29/26
# Meeting ID: 2026-10-29-fgc-1  Duration: 200 min

[00:07:33] Dan Ryan: Good morning.
[00:07:34] Derek Foxworth: Good morning.
[00:07:36] Sameer Kanal: We're going to call this meeting of the Portland City Council Committee of the Whole to order. It is October 29th, 2026, at 9:31 AM. 32 AM. Rebecca, will you please call the roll?
[00:07:51] Rebecca Dobert: Good morning. Clark? Green?
[00:07:55] Mitch Green: Present.
[00:07:57] Rebecca Dobert: Zimmerman? Avalos?
[00:07:59] Candace Avalos: Present.
[00:08:00] Rebecca Dobert: Dunphy?
[00:08:01] Jamie Dunphy: Here.
[00:08:01] Rebecca Dobert: Smith?
[00:08:02] Loretta Smith: Here.
[00:08:05] Rebecca Dobert: Pirtle-Guiney? Ryan?
[00:08:07] Dan Ryan: Here.
[00:08:09] Rebecca Dobert: Koyama Lane?
[00:08:10] Tiffany Koyama Lane: Here.
[00:08:10] Rebecca Dobert: Murillo? Novick.
[00:08:13] Steve Novick: Not absent.
[00:08:15] Rebecca Dobert: Kanal.
[00:08:15] Sameer Kanal: Here. Christopher, will you please read the statement of conduct?
[00:08:20] Christopher: Good morning. Welcome to the meeting of the Finance and Governance Committee of the Whole. To testify before this committee in person or virtually, you must sign up in advance on the committee agenda at www.portland.gov/council/agenda/committee-whole or by calling 311. Information on engaging with the committee can be found at this link. Registration for virtual testimony closes 1 hour prior to the meeting. In-person testifiers must sign up before the agenda item is heard.
[00:08:41] Rebecca Dobert: If public testimony will be taken when called upon an item, individuals may testify for 3 minutes unless the Chair states otherwise. Your microphone will be muted when your time is over. The Chair preserves order. Disruptive conduct such as shouting, refusing to conclude your testimony when your time is up, or interrupting others' testimony or committee deliberations will not be allowed. If you cause a disruption, a warning will be given. Further disruption results in ejection from the meeting. Anyone who fails to leave once ejected is subject to arrest for trespass. Additionally, the committee may take a short recess and reconvene virtually. Your testimony should address the matter being considered. When testifying, state your name for the record.
[00:09:12] Christopher: If you're a lobbyist, identify the organization you represent, and virtual testifiers should unmute themselves when the clerk calls your name. Thank you.
[00:09:20] Sameer Kanal: Thank you, Christopher. Colleagues, today we have a pretty packed agenda, but nothing on our agenda today is getting a vote. Um, there's no legislative items that require a vote. Um, we do have some space and time in the weeks ahead, so some of these items may be continued forward. But our goal today is to get through the presentation and Q&A on, uh, the citywide immigrant affairs lead presentation, as well as the presentation on chemical weapons use, have about 5 minutes for anyone to float any potential legislation that may be coming up, um, that could require Committee of the Whole, uh, consideration, and then get through some of our testimony. We've put in the, uh, in the signup form for people when they're testifying that we can probably get through 15, maybe 17 or 18 folks, uh, for testimony. And after that, we might continue that public hearing item on. Um, in order to do that, I might be giving some specific time throughout this process, we've got about, I think, 20 minutes for the presentation plus 25 for Q&A on the citywide immigrant affairs lead. I think it's 35 and 40 respectively on the other presentation on chemical weapons as well. So we're going to try to hold to that just to make sure that we're not cutting off testimony at the end. And then we will have the opportunity, pending of course our presenters' schedules, to invite them back over the next couple weeks to continue this conversation. There is a little bit of space in the schedule. Thank you. Um, can you please call item 1?
[00:10:48] Rebecca Dobert: Item 1, committee chair updates, document number 2026-388.
[00:10:53] Sameer Kanal: All right, so colleagues, we have, um, I'm going to be brief with the chair update today. We've got, um, a few things that have been moved around, um, with the, um, knowledge that next week we are meeting. This committee is the only committee that's meeting next week, but because of HVAC work At City Hall. The meeting will not be here. It will be entirely virtual. And because of that and a couple other things, we've got a few things within November got moved around. I'll also note that the vice chairs of the committee, Councilor Ryan and Councilor Koyama Lane, will be chairing the meeting on November 12th. They'll be calling in remotely for that. So that's basically what's changed on the first page. We've also added a couple more appointments that have been requested by the administration in December. Thank you. There's no changes on either of the next 2, uh, 3 sections, 2, 3, and 4. I will note that we had a request early in the year to discuss public arts and monuments. We have not scheduled that, partially because nobody has really taken on sort of what does that conversation look like. If anyone is interested in that, I'd be happy to add them to this list. I know that Councilor Ryan has, uh, has a lot of experience in this area. Uh, as well. But if anyone would like to be added, let me know, and that can be for planning for something in January. And then I did want to note that Councilor Clark let me know that she couldn't be here in time for the, uh, report today. She has a conflict. And so, um, I won't— we won't be doing the committee update on Public Works this week. We will just kind of continue our rotation into next week for, uh, Chair Novick of Community and Public Safety next week. Um, but I did want to just briefly say that this week at, at the, um, Public Works Committee, we had 2 items. One is an ordinance that was referred to the full council that will allow a little more flexibility for Portlanders to paint the curb directly outside and adjacent to their driveway. And the other, um, was a discussion with no legislative item relate— just continuing our conversation on automated— sorry, autonomous vehicles. Um, that's pretty much all I have this week. Not a whole lot new here. Are there any questions before we move on to the next item? All right, we'll move ahead. Rebecca, will you please call item 2?
[00:13:10] Rebecca Dobert: Item 2, report from citywide immigration affairs lead, document number 2026-381.
[00:13:18] Sameer Kanal: Thank you so much. We have with us our citywide immigrant affairs lead, Brenda Alvarado. Thank you so much for being here, and I'll, uh, hand it over to you.
[00:13:28] Unidentified speaker: I'll start us out with just with some opening comments while Brenna gets set up. Uh, want to keep in mind that the Sanctuary City Ordinance and the Portland, uh, Protect Portland Initiative was passed in October of 2025. It was important for the city to stand with our immigrant neighbors, uh, reaffirm our status as a sanctuary city, and put protocols in place for reporting interactions with federal immigration enforcement officials. At the time of passing, there was no funding allocated for the coordination of this work. The mayor's office provided funding to bring on a coordinator, Brenda, who has— who was hired in February of 2026. While she started in the mayor's office, she is now working in the administration office. Today, Brenda will be sharing her work to date. This content makes up the majority of the required she will be releasing the report next week following feedback from this work session. While we are conscious that we do not have the capacity to add new work beyond what the ordinance and resolution has called for, we do want to ensure that the yearly report is in alignment with council's expectations. We look forward to the conversation today, and now I'll turn it over to Brenda. Thank you, Council President Jamie Dunphy. The first-ever Immigrant Affairs Lead for the city, to walk us through her presentation.
[00:15:03] Sameer Kanal: Thank you so much.
[00:15:04] Brenda Alvarado: Thank you, City Administrator, for that kind introduction. Chair Kanal, for the invitation to present, and the councilors for the opportunity to share the work. My computer just restarted just to like— because I don't have enough cortisol. Sorry. Thank you for the opportunity to present. I It's been a year. October 15th, 2025 is when the sanctuary ordinance and the Protect Portland Initiative resolution was passed. And I guess I should start off with my name. It's helpful to have these signs. My name is Brenda Alvarado, the City of Portland Immigrant Affairs Lead. And when these 2 pieces of legislation were passed, I was not with the city. I was actually with advocates outside of the ICE facility supporting immigrants who had ICE appointments families and individuals who are trying to find their loved ones. And I think it's important to really understand where the mindset was for councilors as well as the community in passing these pieces of legislation. And so with the intent of trying to understand where you all had, uh, the intent you all had in passing this legislation, I actually reviewed the, the hearing of when this legislation was passed and next slide, please. And at that time, we did not know, but Operation Black Rose was underway. And there was a testimony from a Portlander who had shared that the first bus had arrived at McAdam, and that bus is a bus that transports immigrants from the Portland ICE facility— Portland processing facility— to Tacoma, Washington. And she had expressed just the, the real fear of what that meant for our community. And I remember being an advocate outside of the ICE facility and seeing that bus and the dread and anxiety of what that bus meant. That bus meant that it would— it was going to be more windows broken. It meant that we were going to have more teenagers show up outside of our— outside of the ICE facility trying to find their parents. It meant that children were going to go home and not have one or two parents there because they were taken. Um, It meant that more families were going to be separated. And a lot has changed since the year that these 2 pieces of legislation that has passed, but that bus is now a regular occurrence. It is coming weekly, if not multiple times a week. And detentions, despite it being less visible on social media, it is increasing. And so in October 2025, Operation Black Rose was initiative from the federal government in which they sent 100 federal agents to the Portland metro area to increase immigration enforcement statewide. To show in comparison, the first 8 months of 2025, there's 462 people detained. In the first month of Operation Black Rose, that was— there was 362 Oregonians who were detained. So the increase of federal presence had an immediate impact of destruction in our community. At that time, PERC was reporting 15 to 45 detentions per day, and the National Guard threat was looming. Thank you. Today we are continuing to see detentions, but the administration has gotten smarter. They are using administrative tactics to entrap immigrant communities, and anytime an immigrant is making a mistake because of these entrapments, the penalty is harsh and severe and likely a detention order. And we are seeing national tactics show up locally, including the mega master hearing, airport detentions, and we are seeing increased surveillance. Thank you. The federal surge threat looms. We're seeing nationally early in October there was an uptick of immigration enforcement here, and we are seeing that the, the increase in enforcement is popping up in cities across the nation. And the ability to increase the immigration enforcement capacity is, is quick and easy for the federal administration, who's using every resource possible to separate our communities and our family. Next slide, please. Thank you. The first slide here demonstrates just that. And so this information is from the Portland Immigrant Rights Coalition. It is the entity that's monitoring immigration enforcement for the state. It is a self-reported hotline, so often these numbers are underreported. And so if you see that long line, that is where we're at in 2026. And then that shorter, thicker line is 2025. Continuously, we are seeing higher amounts, 50% increase in the number of people who are detained specifically. So for the first 8 months of 2025, we saw 462 detentions. In 2026, in that same 8-month period, there was over 700. And so advocates are wondering, how is this possible? How is this going on when we're not seeing it? And it is because, as I mentioned, the administration is getting smarter. Next slide, please. And this information is from the Data Deportation Defense Project, but it was also taken from an Oregonian article that was highlighting the administrative arrests by ICE in Oregon that has seen a significant uptick since January 20th. If you can see, um, when President Trump came into office, you saw an immediate impact. And since this past, uh, year, we are seeing a continuing increase of the federal government using the federal administration, the processes, to continue to entrap immigrant communities. Next slide. And so, as I mentioned, as I mentioned, uh, detentions are happening at a higher rate, but we're not seeing it. And these are called detention pipelines. One of the detention pipelines that was happening nationally and now we're seeing here locally in Portland is a mega master hearing. A mega master hearing is a tactic in which asylum seekers, because there's such a significant backlog, are having their hearings rescheduled with little notice and as early as years in advance and months in advance. So you may be an asylum seeker and think your hearing is not until 2029, and the administration has moved it to tomorrow. And you are operating and moving around in society thinking that you have complied and are continuing to have your deportation protections from having an active asylum case, but you don't know that you missed your hearing and thus an order of deportation has been ordered, has been issued for you. And this national tactic we saw some really concerning implications in Chicago. 58% Of those who had, 10,000 people who had these hearings, 58% were ruled absent because they were not notified. Because these hearings, which are often 12 to 20 people, are being packed up as much as 100. And so not only are folks not getting notice of their hearings, but they're showing up to the hearings and there's so much chaos that they're not hearing their name and they're not being properly moved forward. Councilor Smith, marked as present. And so that is one of the main tactics that we're seeing here in Portland. Portland has— Oregon has one immigration court that serves the state and also neighboring states, um, and it has 2 mega hearings per week on average that we're seeing from advocates. Next slide, please. Uh, the other detention pipeline is temporary protected status. So temporary protected status is, uh, a protection that is, uh, at the discretion of the Department of, um, of the Secretary of State, and it's a protection that is given to nationals who are from countries where there is some sort of unrest. And it is— what is given to these individuals is protection from deportation and work authorization. And when the Trump administration came into power, there was close to 1.2 million people from 17 countries with TPS status. Since then, there is only 4 countries that continue to have this status, leaving all of these families folks with little to no pathways to adjust their status. And what's concerning is Haiti, for example, has currently— the State Department says it's a level 4. US citizens should not be traveling there because of the unrest and how unsafe it is. But at the same time, the administration has revoked the temporary protected status for these, for the Haitian community. And so you're seeing immigrants who are being forced in a position that they are having to return to countries that are unsafe. Thank you. And, and, or stay here and be in the shadows and, and be targeted by the administration. And so, uh, that is one of the pipelines that we're seeing, um, that are resulting in, in community members losing some necessary safeguards. Uh, next slide, please. Uh, there is not discrimination that's happening for those who are being detained. Uh, 75 different countries, um, nationals that were detained here in Oregon from 2025 to 2026. The majority of them is Mexican citizens with Guatemalans, Venezuelan, but we saw in the first year of the Trump administration that there was a priority with the Latino community, and we're seeing that it's expanded as they're continuing to hit these very high and arbitrary detention quotas. Next slide, please. And to see the current landscape and to ensure that our current protocols and policies are reflective of what the harm is right now is this is where detentions are happening location-wise. So 24% is the biggest percentage in this from July to September, and that is at big box stores. Innovation Law Lab sued the federal government earlier this year in spring because Portland— Oregonians were able to document that ICE was making arrests without warrants. Oregon became one of 3 states that had a ban on warrantless arrests by ICE. It was a was a critical safeguard that allowed for immigrant communities to have due process. Earlier this fall, we were seeing the increase of detentions, and so Innovation Law Lab went back to court and said to the judge, ICE is not following your detention— your ruling, and asked for the judge to rule again to enforce ICE to follow the original ruling. And in the discovery, they found that ICE was in parking lots and running license plates. And if your name popped up, they were then arresting you. And so that leads to the big store parking lots. And until that information was discovered, immigrant communities were terrified. They were scared the self-checkout was maybe giving that to ICE. They were scared that if they talked to an employee at one of these big box stores, that they were sharing information. And so it really paints how much fear and how much surveillance and just anxiety these communities are having. The other thing to note in this is that the other detention rate, 21%, is detentions on the road. ICE's reports are that ICE is arriving on scene and is off the scene and detains someone within 90 seconds. So as I mentioned, they're getting smarter, they're becoming strategic, they are doing targeted arrests by entrapping people and removing their protections without properly notifying them. And then they are also running the license plates to either get them at the store or get them down the road, because when they are isolated and when they're by themselves, it's harder for them— for people to be notified that they've been taken. ICE does not leave a note saying, if— please contact this number, this family individual was taken. And so oftentimes, and even in October, earlier this month, With the uptick of detentions, people forgot what it was like, and there was a lot of family members who thought families were kidnapped because you just see broken glass and you don't know where that family member is. They didn't show up to work. Next slide. During the same period of July-September 2026, 62 of those detentions were in Multnomah, and 21 counties had Multnomah continues to be the higher detention county. It's hard to say whether or not it's because we're— we have the Portland ICE facility, whether it's because we're being targeted. But a big— another factor is that we are training our community to call PERC. And so because we have a more trained community, we are having the notification become easier and having that oversight possible. Thank you. Next slide, please. So that is the current landscape that we're in and the sanctuary protection progress that we've done since October 25th. We submitted a FOIA request to ICE, USCIS, and the Immigrant Executive Office of Immigration Review, as is directed by the sanctuary ordinance, to increase transparency and to also get information that is not being shared outright by the federal government so that you all, policymakers, and then the city administration can have policies and protocols that reflect the current need. We've held 2 immigrant forums. These immigrant forums is the Asian Immigrant Forum and the African Immigrant Forum. These are know-your-rights trainings that we partner with Innovation Law Lab and Portland Immigrant Rights Coalition. And we specifically chose the Asian immigrant community and the African immigrant community because they are underdiscussed when we're talking about it, and they are, they are one of those that are being the Latinx community made up the majority of the detentions last year, and because of that, they were able to create a very strong rapid response infrastructure. And we wanted to share those best practices with other communities, and the feedback has been really positive. We've also had rapid response networks established within the city. So I took over a meeting that was originally created by Councilor Koyama Lane during the first year of the Trump administration where we regularly meet with rapid response advocates to ensure that we are advocating and supporting the needs of the community. They hired an immigrant affairs lead to centralize the coordination. The police has created protocol and trainings to ensure that they are fulfilling their obligations within the sanctuary city codification and the state Sanctuary Promise Act. We have created the employee protocol for interacting with immigration agents. There's an internal infrastructure for immigrant affairs liaisons. There is a sanctuary city resource hub created, and then we have designated the public and non-public signage across the city, citywide. And we have citywide reporting portals to document any sort of ICE immigration activity to ensure that we have a proper understanding of how this is showing up in our city spaces and next slide. Employee preparedness. So the mayor has, and the city administrator have expressed that our first priority is employees. We cannot make sure that the public is safe if we're not making the institution safe first. And so the protocols that are being developed and/or are developed are an employee— what happens when employees approached by an ICE agent, What happens if an employee observes a detention while working, or what happens when a city employee is detained? We're also ensuring that employees understand their sanctuary responsibilities under federal, state, and local law and resources available to them. And lastly, as I mentioned, clarifying the public and non-public areas in city facilities and training employees on how the public or even immigration agents should be accessing those spaces to ensure that the intention of documenting those are being fulfilled. Next slide, please. So the approach for the how— what happens when an employee is approached by a federal agent, it's a no wrong door approach. We originally wanted one phone call to ensure that there's one phone call anyone who is being approached by an ICE agent can contact this phone call to initiate the citywide awareness that an immigration agent is asking either for information about someone or right now, the way that the process is, is that it's a yellow card. Employees, and those are for non-supervisors or for supervisors who feel that it would be harmful to interact with an ICE agent, they would have this yellow card, and if an ICE agent is approached to them, they will pass that along to the ICE agent. The intention of this is that ICE agents are intimidating and they are not a friendly presence to the public. Thank you. A frequent occurrence. And so we want to ensure that the folks who are reviewing judicial warrants are trained and also are comfortable with enforcing boundaries and city protocols. And so this really is to support the frontline workers and ensure that at least also someone is notified that ICE is there. And so a, a yellow card employee will hand this over to the ICE agent, they will step away, and they will notify their security partners. So if you are a parks employee, you will contact the parks rangers. And the security team is made up of 311, park rangers, the security operations here with Manny, Mike Porter, myself. And the purpose of this is that— and also PBEM— the purpose of this is that citywide we know what's happening and we can all coordinate. And if there is ways to mitigate risk and notify other people who are in that area, we can do that. Thank you. The other purpose is that we are notifying the mayor and the city administrator with recommendations and updates that this is happening, as well as council. And then the next thing is employees, informing the public and employees if it feels appropriate. An orange card holder will be individuals who will be reviewing the judicial warrant to determine if that warrant satisfies the legal requirements to grant access to a nonpublic space or information. An orange card holder will have a checklist that is, and that's on the right, that is to be completed 'Cause every part of that in that list is required for it to be a valid warrant to grant access or assist or information. Again, these incidents are not happening often, and so we heard from employees they want the ability to be able to know what to do in these rare occurrences. Next slide, please. The other part of these employee protocols is having employees feel that they are not abandoning and it is a way for us to support individuals in the most effective way that allows for our personnel and legal partners to provide due process to them. And so this on the right, as I mentioned, Oregon became one of 3 states that had a ban on warrantless arrest. And that's because we trusted the system, we trusted our legal partners, and we continue to use the tools that are effective. And that is what the effective tools are. And so communicating that to employees so that they do not feel like they are being targeted or targeted add harm to themselves or to the community is part of that training as well. Next slide. This is the internal immigrant affairs liaisons. These are a network that's supposed to help implement, provide feedback on how these protocols are implemented and developed, as well as be a source of— a resource for employees if they have questions, they feel that there's any gaps in policy or protocol, or have any questions about what resources are available. Thank you. Citywide, we have 64, and I meet with them biweekly. Next slide. This is the sanctuary website for city employees, and we are working on creating guides, printable yellow and orange cards. The first round of yellow and orange cards will be delivered, but if they need new ones, they can print them off. Printable signs for non-public areas to establish that. An immigrant liaison reference guide. You can find the reporting interaction protocol the Human Resource Immigration Leave Policy, which you all passed, that allows city employees to take leave if they've had immigration detention in their immediate family, and then community resources for employees to share. Next slide. The sanctuary ordinance and the Protect Portland Initiative resolution had specific directives for the Portland Police Bureau. And early on, the Portland Police Bureau created their own reporting app called FIRA, the Federal Immigration Reporting Application. FIRA. And that became live December 2025, prior to the citywide resolver app that is for the rest of the city. They also early on created training and protocols with interacting with immigration enforcement. They created these cards for individuals who have English as a second language that you can carry on you, and if you are pulled over by a police officer, you can show that, and police officers know that that individual would need interpretation. They also created a referral resource because at the beginning of the surge, and continues, people were reporting kidnapping. And after their investigation, they found that it was an ICE detention. This QR code is given to those individuals that connects them to immigration services and support. They've also done community safety workshops for immigrant and refugees in which they do what you should know when someone is pulled over, what services PPB can provide for you, and also listening sessions to hear back from the community. Thank you. As we see immigration agents continuously erode trust with local law enforcement by masking as police officers or masking and not identifying themselves, these intentional efforts by PPB has allowed for the immigrant and refugee community to feel that there is one government entity who is trying to, to provide support as the federal government is using every resource to target and harm them. Thank you. Next slide. The other part is intergovernmental coordination. The City of Portland does not have the billions that the federal government has dedicated to immigration enforcement. And so what has to happen is we are stronger by being effective with our resources and using and partnering with different levels of government. And so one example of that intergovernment coordination is myself and the federal government relations for the city partnered up and asked the congressional delegation if they could do an oversight visit to the Portland ICE facility after we heard reports that there was a spike in requests earlier this month and that attorneys were being denied access, in one instance, 12 times in one day. That visit did happen and it provided some critical information for rapid response partners and oversight, and that folks are watching and due process matters for immigrants, and we will be ringing the bell when that is violated. Thank you. The next that we did is when we were informed of the mega master hearings, we quickly elevated that to city leadership and the mayor made a personal call to the governor as well as the attorney general. And then the staff from all 3 of us met up and discussed what the potential implications and harms. And ultimately on October 6th, the attorney general and governor sent a letter to the US Attorney General. Thank you. And EOIR calling for the immediate halt. We participate in weekly calls with congressional and state offices and community advocacy organizations to provide updates, share supports, and try to use our platforms as much as possible to provide oversight and transparency when trends are being elevated in that. The other thing that we do is, as I mentioned, Councilor Koyama Lane had created this weekly meeting with advocates and I have taken that over since coming into this role. And City of Portland is doing a lot of great work. And what we do is we had heard from advocates that there is some concerns with their emergency communications in Southern Oregon, and they wanted to understand more about how that works. And so BOEC Director Mosley did a presentation to those advocates so that they could understand how it works, and they can try to formulate ways to, um, have specific asks in, in other spaces, in other counties, in other cities. And so really being a resource and trying to use any res— any of our resources to support the community. The other thing is we initiated a peer city immigrant strategy call with our sister cities Chicago, LA, Minneapolis to understand what the best practices are for FOIA requests, what direct services. And it really thank you. And that was helpful in formulating what the next phase of our FOIA initiative is. And we supported Newport's legal effort for greater transparency in ICE's— the federal government's efforts to create a detention facility without notifying the city. And as of this past week, they are now required and committed to the city to advance notice of any plans of building. Oregon does not have any detention facilities. It's one of our strongest safeguards, uh, in the state to ensure that, uh, the capacity, um, has some sort of, uh, the capacity of detention has a limit. Um, the Portland ICE facility, the Portland ICE facility McAdam, is a processing facility, but anyone there who is ultimately detained is sent to the closest detention, which is Tacoma. Next slide.
[00:40:53] Sameer Kanal: I just want to make sure we have time for questions.
[00:40:55] Brenda Alvarado: Oh yeah, a little over.
[00:40:56] Unidentified speaker: Um, so I wanna give you—.
[00:40:57] Brenda Alvarado: Can you gimme a time check how much I have?
[00:40:59] Sameer Kanal: You're over by about 5 so far.
[00:41:01] Brenda Alvarado: Oh, okay.
[00:41:02] Sameer Kanal: Yeah, but I'll give you—.
[00:41:03] Brenda Alvarado: I will go ahead and move this, and this will be in an annual report. So also, another effort that the city has done is we worked with PBEM to ensure that we have a proactive response and not a reactive response if we see another operation happening here. So we have 3, 4 different levels and different thresholds. And in each of these levels, different city services and communications are activated to ensure that we are acting swiftly and effectively. Next slide. FOIA information initiatives. So we did 3 of them. The purpose of this is to really try to understand how and what mechanisms the federal government is using to detain Portlanders. Currently we have 2 active immigration with ICE and EOIR. The purpose is to understand how many of these folks had criminal records, how many of these folks are voluntary how many of these had expedited removals? USCIS ultimately denied our request, and we are reviewing that. Next slide, please. We did get a response from ICE, and it was not accurate or complete data, but for the most part, it did match the general trends in that we are seeing an uptick of detentions. This is just an example. Next slide. And it also matches the national trends in that the majority of those who are being detained do not have a criminal record. 70% Are not having a criminal active convicted criminal record. Next slide, please. Councilor Herbold. Next slide. This is a Sanctuary Promise violation complaint. So as is directed, these are the 6 complaints that have been issued to the City of Portland. 4 of them are with the Portland Police Bureau, 1 is with 311, and 1 is the City of Portland. There's been no findings of Sanctuary Promise Act, and this reporting period is from May 2025 to present. Next slide. The other thing that the sanctuary ordinance and resolution, it requires the city monitor immigration enforcement requests, communications, and activities between October 25th to October 31st, 2025. October 2026. What ultimately showed in this data is that there was coordination and training gaps that led to overreporting and inaccurate data. BOEC reported 87 incidents. Only 29 of those actually were within the scope of immigration enforcement activity. 27 Of those incidents involved federal agency notifying BOEC of activity in the area. 2 Of those incidents regarded like medical, some harm, and then PPB reported 9 instances and only 7 of those instances were actual immigration enforcement activity. 50 Of the incidents from BOIC were related to protest activity outside of the McAdam facility. And so that is not immigration enforcement and not within the scope of the ordinance or resolution. Next slide. And the next phase is operationalize, coordinate, oversee, and measure outcomes and demonstrate impact. I look forward to hearing what your thoughts our suggestions and how we can better, um, you know, align the intent with council, um, with the ordinance and resolution. Thank you.
[00:44:03] Steve Novick: Thank you so much, Brenda, for being here. Colleagues, uh, if you would like to ask any questions, um, please feel free to get in the queue. We've got about 11 or 12 minutes left for this agenda item, so everybody should have 3 or 4 minutes. Um, I'll start with Councilor Novick and then go to Councilor Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for a comprehensive and absolutely horrifying presentation. I was wondering, you said the AG had been contacted about the mega hearings. Did they give any indication as to whether there's some possible legal challenge to those, you know, whether to give people inadequate notice, that some due process challenge or something?
[00:44:40] Brenda Alvarado: It's challenging. Immigration law does not have the same safeguards or statutes that individuals, citizens have. And so I would circle back on that. But it is going to be a challenging case because the statute of safeguards or not in immigration law. But technically, yes, you are supposed to have proper notification. The challenge is if you're deported, um, and you've already been sent to another country, it's hard to really— but there is an active national lawsuit. Thank you. Thank you.
[00:45:07] Sameer Kanal: Councilor Green, and then Councilor Pirtle-Guiney.
[00:45:09] Mitch Green: Thank you so much for the, uh, presentation, Brenda. Um, my question is, are we thinking about like ALPRs and AI and sort of like flock type of cameras in the context of, I know we don't have those in the City of Portland, but are we connecting the dots between any AI initiatives in the City of Portland, any security and surveillance things that we might want to pursue and how that might interfere with our sanctuary city policies? Is that in the purview of your office?
[00:45:40] Brenda Alvarado: Yeah, so I did meet with Hector, which is in the Digital Security Office, and we are looking to see one of the things I do foresee us doing is using that resource and that really critical office to support advocates in understanding and advocating in other places. Because the City of Portland, you may be a Portlander, but you work in Gresham. And so trying to minimize that harm and sharing that resource with other places. Councilmember Herbold. Thank you.
[00:46:18] Mitch Green: I think one of the things I worry about is, as we're thinking about security upgrades in the affordable housing units, Home Forward in particular, are we putting in cameras that can be used by federal immigration agents? So I don't need an answer to that now, but that's something I'm, I'm very concerned about.
[00:46:39] Brenda Alvarado: I appreciate it. Thank you, Your Honor.
[00:46:42] Sameer Kanal: Thank you, Councilor Green. Councilor Pirtle-Guiney.
[00:46:45] Elana Pirtle-Guiney: Thank you, Chair. Brenna, thank you so much for the presentation today. It sounds like your focus has really been around how we make sure that the City of Portland continues to be that trusted resource. I appreciate seeing that spelled out so clearly. Are there pieces that we are missing in our work? Are there things that you would like us to be doing as a city that we haven't get started to do, either because of lack of capacity, lack of resources, um, changes that we need to make in the code in order to make sure we're doing everything we can? Or do you feel like you have the tools that you need to carry out the work right now?
[00:47:28] Brenda Alvarado: Yeah, uh, my program is one person. Um, I've been very fortunate to have the support from the mayor and city administrator in that if I'm asking, uh, something from a bureau, they are being responsive. Uh, but, uh, The challenges is funding for this program. This was an unfunded mandate. And one of the things that I am— one of the things that we can improve is external communication, ensuring that the communities that do need to hear it know that we are taking these precautions, that we are ensuring that, especially as the federal government is using all of these resources to harm them, saying the message that the City of Portland is using and the way to do that is by having accessible information, ensuring that we can tell someone, if you sign up for a swim class for your kid, that is not going to be shared. Definitive and accessible information is what can provide peace of mind because the government is causing chaos, is causing confusion, and just having that peace of mind can allow them to exist in a way that is safe. Thank you. Exist at least a little less, um, with a little less fear. And so know your rights trainings, there's just a lot to be done externally to ensure that the city as a whole is protected.
[00:48:45] Elana Pirtle-Guiney: If there are specific things that council can do to help on the external communication side, I know the first piece you said was funding. Obviously we'll have to have a robust conversation about how we make sure you have the funding that you need during our budget conversations. But if there are pieces council can be doing on the external communication side, I hope that you include that when you get the absolutely. Thank you. I'm also wondering if there are best practices from other cities that we have learned in those calls that you have that we should be considering as we move forward with our work to make sure that we are protecting every single Portlander.
[00:49:20] Brenda Alvarado: Yeah, Boston and Chicago come to mind. Chicago is doing a really great job, also New York. And I think what's common in all of those cities is that they've really made an effort to publicly explain what sanctuary city means, what a protection means. Chicago recently did ads on buses, and on those buses it's a QR code and know your rights information in 7 different languages. And being able to say just as loudly as the federal government that we are here to support you and that we are not supportive of this mass deportation effort can— has been really meaningful. And when we're seeing that in New York as well, as they're continuing to do really got it.
[00:50:05] Elana Pirtle-Guiney: So expanding that know your rights training piece that you've done a few of, and then that external community, back to that external communication piece, some real lessons in how we might do that if we had the resources available.
[00:50:16] Brenda Alvarado: Yeah, absolutely.
[00:50:19] Elana Pirtle-Guiney: Final question. I know we have others in the queue, but a specific one. You had the slide around the revoked TPS status, and that's something that we knew was coming. We tried to get some funding for here, but obviously we were not able to find the resources to help every family. Do we know how many Portlanders are affected by those changes in TPS?
[00:50:44] Brenda Alvarado: We don't know. Oftentimes, and this happens when we're looking at detentions, data is by county or by state, but I can check in with the Office of Immigrant Refugee Advancement. It's the state agency that is monitoring that and see if they have that. They've been tracking the refugee data and information, but I can see if they have anything with TPS. But often the people who hold this information is the federal government, and we can't get it. That transparency doesn't exist.
[00:51:09] Elana Pirtle-Guiney: I think we were able to find funds to help 75 or 80 families. It would be good to know what portion of the Portlanders who have been affected by that change that allowed us to support and how much more work there is to do there.
[00:51:22] Brenda Alvarado: Yeah, absolutely.
[00:51:23] Elana Pirtle-Guiney: Thank you. Thank you. Thank you very much for being here today.
[00:51:26] Sameer Kanal: Thank you, Councilor Pirtle-Guiney. I'm going to close the queue unless anyone would like to get in. Okay, so I'll go Councilor Ryan.
[00:51:32] Dan Ryan: I'll close it out. Thank you. Thank you, Chair. Uh, good to see you, Brenda, and thank you so much for being here. Uh, the truth-telling that you delivered was really comprehensive, and I agree with Councilor Novick, it was horrifying to at least sit with all this information. So thank you for your perseverance and showing up to give us all that information. I also really enjoyed listening to the last dialogue, and Chicago's providing a great practice, and it almost sounded like you— we have an ask of this council in terms of the budget to provide such tools if necessary. You're in a really big connector role, and I was really noticing that, like, yeah, you're one person, but you're connecting with all these dots. I think for me, it's just the church that I attend, and I know that with new arrivals, it's always often the grassroots level is at the heart of it. Thank you. Their communities of faith. So I just want to always see the system from how you connect with those communities all the way up to the, the presentation when you talked about working with the federal delegation. And so I think the more I can make those connections, the more I see the, the very immense value of your role here at the city. Does that make sense?
[00:52:37] Brenda Alvarado: Absolutely. Um, yeah, they— especially when communities are hiding, uh, you have to be with the grassroots, uh, organizations to truly understand what their, um, uh, fears are, what their needs yeah, you know this, and I just wanted to lift that.
[00:52:51] Dan Ryan: I was distracted by slide 16 for one reason. There were zero arrests in April. Is that—.
[00:52:58] Brenda Alvarado: No, it was just incorrect information. Yeah, from the federal government. Yeah, that was from the FOIA request, and we will be appealing that and highlighting.
[00:53:06] Dan Ryan: Okay. Wanted to then daylight that that was odd, and because it is, because it's not true. Okay. And I think that when you're measuring outcomes, I hope that you just measure something and try not to move the goalpost, and then don't let perfection get in the way of good.
[00:53:20] Brenda Alvarado: Yeah, there's plenty in the resolution and ordinance.
[00:53:23] Dan Ryan: Yeah.
[00:53:24] Sameer Kanal: Thank you, Councilor Ryan. I'm last in the queue. I wanted to just first say thank you so much to you, to Mayor Wilson previously, and now City Administrator Lee for sort of housing this work. And I know that there's a lot of immigration liaisons at all the bureaus, and I imagine a lot of them were contributing to this work the way that you mentioned, and also the slides. So thank you to them as well. The slides that I wanted to just kind of note, one was you have a slide— I think mine are out of order, but the one that the header on which is sanctuary protection progress since October 2025, that's a lot of work. And I think you've gone through all of it and just wanted to sort of praise you for that, as well as appreciated the sort of deep dive into Portland Police's work on this. Yeah. They were already subject to sanctuary protections. The ordinance didn't change anything there really for them. But I think that that's— it's very helpful for us to be able to tell that story to the public about what you can expect and how it's different. So I appreciate you highlighting that and the work of Officer Honsberger I saw in the picture there as well. So yeah, thank you so much for being here. I think that closes out the item. Do you want to say anything?
[00:54:39] Brenda Alvarado: I appreciate the opportunity. Thanks.
[00:54:43] Sameer Kanal: All right, um, Rebecca, can you please call the next item?
[00:54:47] Rebecca Dobert: Item 3, chemical weapons usage, document number 2026-389.
[00:54:53] Sameer Kanal: Colleagues, uh, just a housekeeping note on this one. So we had a presentation on the public health impacts of chemical weapons usage, uh, in this committee on August 13th. At that time, Vice Chair Ryan asked if we could also hear a presentation from the folks who use chemical weapons So we definitely started the process of scheduling that. At that time, we invited both of the current users of chemical weapons, the federal government as well as PPB. We did not get a response back from the federal government, you know, ICE, on, on that to come and, and let us know what their processes are. We did hear back from PPB, and I'm very grateful that they're able to be here with us. So I think we have Deputy Chief Hughes, Assistant Chief Shane, as well as— I'm, I'm not commander still?
[00:55:37] Derek Foxworth: Yes.
[00:55:37] Sameer Kanal: Commander Derek Foxworth Jr. Thank you all for being here, and please introduce everyone as you go.
[00:55:45] Unidentified speaker: Good morning. I'll start us out with opening comments, and then I'll turn it over to our PPB staff to follow up on the presentation. I just want to first say thank you for giving us the opportunity to share background information on the use of chemical munitions in our you will hear a presentation today that outlines the considerations that PPB and others have put into ensuring the safety of Portlanders while being able to respond to violent or even dangerous situations within our city. You will also hear the environmental impacts and how the Bureau of Environmental Services interacts with this work. I want to start by saying that my priority is first the city, uh, security and the safety of all Portlanders, including our city staff and council. For PPB, it is a tool of last resort in public order events. Chemical munitions for crowd control have not been used in 6 years in our city. PPB has invested heavily in a dialogue-led facilitation, facilitation-first approach to public order events and leading the nation in crowd control management conversations with our approaches. There are instances, as you hear about today, where its use protects our city employees from getting hurt when they are trying to keep community members from hurting each other. And now I'll turn it over to PPB and BES to walk us through their presentation today. Thank you.
[00:57:22] Franz Schaning: All right, good morning, Chair Kanal, Vice Chairs Ryan and Koyama Lane, members of council. Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today and to provide information on the current state of rules around the use of chemical munitions in the state of Oregon and the city of Portland, and information on how the Portland Police Bureau currently uses these tools in a small number of high-risk incidents to reduce the likelihood of harm to community members and city employees. Also, I want to express my appreciation for Ms. Alvarado's testimony and for the report we just heard As well as the work the city is doing to support our community members who are immigrants and refugees during this difficult time, we're proud to be part of that effort. For the record, my name is Franz Schaning, and I currently serve as the assistant chief for the police bureau's investigations branch, which includes both our rapid response team, our public order specialists, and our special emergency reaction team, our tactical incident specialists. You'll be hearing more about these two programs later in this presentation. I currently serve as the bureau's crowd management incident commander program manager. And I've personally been involved in public order operations for almost 20 years. I teach nationally on the topic and have spoken both nationally and internationally on this topic. I'm joined here this morning by Commander Derek Foxworth and Matthew Cribley from the Bureau of Environmental Services. I want to begin by acknowledging the testimony you previously heard on the public health impacts of chemical munitions at the Committee of the Whole meeting in August. Those presenters raised concerns about human health, about the environment, and about the excessive use of chemical munitions by the federal government this past year around the ICE facility. Those concerns are legitimate, and the city shares them. I appreciate the opportunity to provide you with additional information on how the city of Portland weighs and balances those risks when crafting sound operational policies and practices around the use of chemical munitions. I empathize with community members who are subjected to those federal actions, including our neighbors who live and work in the neighborhoods surrounding the ICE facility. I believe good governance and crafting good policy sometimes requires us to occasionally talk about data. Probabilities, and risk management principles in a detached way, and parts of this presentation will feel like that. But I don't ever want those discussions to obscure what this conversation is really about: the safety and well-being of our community members and our city employees. Underneath every decision about force— whether to use it, what kind, and when— lies the principle of the sanctity of life. I also believe good governance requires transparency and candor. This conversation about whether or not to ban chemical munitions in the City of Portland will not address the community concerns we've— that have been expressed about the federal government's overreach or unconstitutional practices. As we've seen in court cases recently, state and local regulations cannot restrain the federal government's actions. This conversation is about whether the City Council wants to impose a ban on the use of chemical munitions by the Portland Police Bureau. So let me be clear about what this presentation is and what it is not. It is not a proposal to increase or expand the use of chemical munitions. It is an effort to provide you with objective information about how this tool is actually governed and used today in the City of Portland and the important role it plays in a small number of critical public safety situations. It is an argument to maintain the status quo. Updates to state law, bureau policies, and practices since 2020 have provided a robust framework where the Portland Police Bureau has not used chemical munitions for public order in over 6 years. As we move through the presentation, I also want to recognize that some of the slides are dense with information. We requested 3 hours on the agenda, but I recognize there are other important topics that also deserve your attention. Your officers should have a copy of the presentation, and we're willing to meet with each of you or your staff for more in-depth conversations or to answer follow-up questions if you'd like. I would also like to respectfully request you hold your questions until the end of the presentation if possible. I also want to point out that as we move through the presentation, that although we understand that a proposed ban on chemical munitions would likely include all uses of the tool, the City of Portland currently has the capability to use chemical munitions the first is in a public order setting, and again, we haven't used this tool in that context since September of 2020. The second is during critical incidents involving their special emergency reaction team, and Commander Foxworth will discuss the use of chemical munitions in that context. Next slide, please. So this is a rough breakdown of how we'll proceed through the presentation. We're going to start by addressing some of the concerns you've already heard. We'll talk about the current state of Oregon law, law, bureau policy, the challenges that would be posed by a ban being implemented, and then our recommendations moving forward. Next slide, please. Before I get to the law and our policies and practices, I want to acknowledge the history here in Portland, including what happened in 2020. I want to recognize the harm and trauma carried today by community members, our city employees, and elected officials. I know some of you were personally impacted by the events of 2020. Frankly, the police bureau was unprepared for the events of 2020. Practices we had relied on in years past were not effective in that moment. There were many peaceful and lawful protests that happened during that time, and I'm proud of the work we did in those moments. However, we lacked the ability to intervene in a focused manner when acts of violence or property destruction did occur, and that resulted in overreliance on misdemeanor arrests, crowd dispersals, and the use of force, including chemical munitions. Following those events, the city commissioned an independent assessment of our 2020 response under the Department of Justice settlement agreement. The Independent Monitor LLC found the city relied too heavily on crowd dispersal with CS gas and concluded that the heavy use of riot control agents was counterproductive. We agree. We're not here to relitigate 2020. We're here to tell you what changed because of it. The second concern I want to address is the federal government's actions. In the past year, federal agents at the South Waterfront Ice Facility have deployed chemical munitions in ways that we believe have been disproportionate and unconstitutional. The police bureau has called that behavior out in federal court. Councilmember Herbold. The mayor's office has condemned those actions in the strongest terms. Two different federal judges have restricted federal agencies' use of crowd control munitions. Both of those orders are paused while the Ninth Circuit rules on appeals. I'll touch again on this later because we, although we agree that this issue calls for action, a city ordinance is the wrong solution for that problem. Next slide, please. And now I'm going to turn it over to Matthew Cribley from the Bureau of Environmental Services to talk about the environmental issues.
[01:03:19] Matthew Cribley: Good morning, members of council. My name is Matthew Cribley, and I'm the Technical Services Group Manager and the Environmental Compliance Officer for the Bureau of Environmental Services. I want to talk a little bit about a study that we conducted in 2020. And as a result of the heavy use of riot control agents downtown, BES, Bureau of Environmental Services, was required by the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality to conduct a study to evaluate the impacts of those pollutants to the city storm system from riot control agents, their impact to the city storm system, and their potential impact to receiving waters, the Willamette River. We collected— during that study, we collected sediment samples from 7 catch basins in the area of conflict and around the courthouse, and as well as one from a control site. We also collected storm samples from a storm that occurred on August these storm samples were collected at a control site, the epicenter of the, the conflict, as well as the— at the outfall into the river. We compared those results to typical stormwater sample results. The—. Basically what I would like to talk about is the back— from, from the background of our background research as well as sampling of events and the sample results, we learned several things. First, many of the pollutants found in riot control agents are also commonly found in stormwater, such as copper, lead, and zinc. That makes it very difficult to differentiate between background pollutants and RCA contributions. Many of the pollutants found in riot control agents are also found in things such as firework were fireworks, wood preservatives, burned trash, plastics, and that sort of thing, other materials that were readily used or discarded and burned during the protest and the activities on site. Higher concentrations of these types of pollutants from riot control agents were also found at the epicenter where RCA deployment was the highest. Elevated levels of metals such as barium, lead, copper, and zinc were found in storm drains at the point of RCA deployment, and that these levels tapered off to within a normal pollutant concentration for urban stormwater before reaching the outfall. One of the most important things we learned from this process and from this study is that tear gas found in our storm system was in particulate form and could be effectively managed with pollution prevention techniques such as installing catch basin filters and street flushing. Next slide, please. So when protests started in 2025 at the ICE facility, we immediately installed catch basin filters. After heavy deployments of RCAs, we continued to inspect the area, and if the street is is covered or has a lot of RCA residuals, we will flush the street, capture, and dispose of the wastewater. In effect, we do this for 3 primary reasons. One, from an environmental perspective, this prevents pollutants from entering our storm system and from reaching the river. Further, these practices allow the city to meet the conditions of our state and federal stormwater permit requirements. Second, personnel health and safety. We are not placing staff in harm's way. We do not go on site until the activity has cooled. If there is something we need to check, like inspect our filters or check for excessive residuals, and there's still activity going on, we will ask the police for a police escort onto the site. Third, the third benefit is a cost benefit. When there is a particular location that is prone to environmental impacts from unpredictable situations, Thank you. It is much more efficient and cost-effective to prevent pollution than to allow it to occur, then investigate, try to assign responsibility, and enforce. And ultimately, a BES and Environmental Services has code authority under 1730 City Code 1739 and the demonstrated ability to effectively protect our storm infrastructure. And just to clarify, RCA is riot control agent. Riot control agent. I apologize. The riot control agent was the term used in our study, and I kind of used that as a generic term. Sorry about that.
[01:08:11] Unidentified speaker: Next slide.
[01:08:13] Franz Schaning: All right, so I want to be clear, we're talking about health impacts. I want to be clear that we're not arguing that chemical munitions don't carry a risk to human health. Health. Chemical munitions are a force tool and by their nature carry some risk, but the Bureau weighs those risks carefully, and force tools are used in accordance with the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Oregon, Oregon state law, and Bureau policy. But those standards are just one part of the evaluation. We also look to best practices and standards in the industry, to academic research or studies on tools and tactics, and when possible, to our own testing and evaluation. When we look at that information, we try to apply a critical lens. We don't take for granted everything a manufacturer or a vendor tells us, or practices that may be acceptable or recommended in other parts of the world but would not be acceptable to our community. We also look for objective, evidence-based research when it's available. When it comes to chemical munitions, there are relatively few scientific studies that have been done in controlled settings because of the ethical implications of using force on test subjects. As a result, most studies or evaluations are limited to post-incident collection of data or information related to exposures. Our review of the objective clinical literature is consistent. The large majority of exposures to chemical munitions are limited and resolve within 10 to 30 minutes of removal from the source. Serious complications are rare, and they're concentrated in specific scenarios: prolonged exposure, repeated exposure, high concentrations, poorly ventilated or enclosed spaces, vulnerable populations, or individuals with pre-existing respiratory conditions. Bureau policies, training, and practices around the deployment of chemical munitions are specifically designed to mitigate heightened risks in those scenarios. What is difficult is weighing how to evaluate anecdotal instances of injuries or deaths caused by the improper use of chemical munitions, such as those you heard about during the August presentation. Reports or studies produced by advocacy groups groups or studies with admitted design flaws. Information from those sources still needs to be considered, but again viewed with a critical lens. Some of these recent reports have also highlighted possible impacts to women's reproductive health following repeated exposures to chemical munitions. I would note that we have women on both our rapid response team and our special emergency reaction team. We take the health of our community members and our own city employees seriously and will continue to reevaluate that body of research as it develops. Next slide, please. Following the events of 2020, the Oregon State Legislature tackled the issue of chemical munitions being used during First Amendment events. There were 2 rounds of deliberate legislative work that engaged elected officials, local government, police agencies, and community members. In 2021, the legislature passed House Bill 2928 and tied the use of tear gas to a formally declared riot. Cities, including Portland, found that standard created problematic technical requirements and prevented officers from intervening in objectively dangerous situations that didn't meet the threshold of a riot declaration. In 2022, the legislature revisited the issue and passed House Bill 4008, which adopted the current objectively reasonable de-escalation-first standard, the settled statewide framework still enforced today under the adopted law, ORS 181A-708. The point here is simple. The state has already had this exact debate twice and landed on a carefully calibrated framework that has been demonstrated over the last several years years to strike the proper balance. The state framework has provided consistency across jurisdictions in the state of Oregon, including with our mutual aid partners that we rely on to provide assistance during complex public order events. Again, the Bureau has not used chemical munitions for public order since the state law took effect. I also want to highlight that this state law was in effect last year and did not prevent the federal government's use of chemical munitions around the ICE facility. A city ban on chemical munitions would depart from that thought statewide framework, create risk for our community and city employees, and still not address the underlying issue of federal actions. Next slide, please. So let's talk about ORS 181A-708. I want to start here by discussing what tear gas is and also importantly what it is not. Based on questions or comments we've received from community and elected officials, it's clear there's some confusion. There are a number of terms used in the industry and common vernacular to refer to chemical munitions, including chemical agents, agents, chemical irritants, riot control agents, and tear gas. But when the average layperson thinks of tear gas, they picture videos of burning canisters that emit large quantities of smoke and irritant. But the definition of tear gas under Oregon Revised Statutes, as you can see from the slide, covers almost any force tool that delivers a chemical irritant outside of individually targeted pepper spray or impact munitions with a chemical payload. I also want to point out what tear gas is not. It is not a chemical weapon. Covered by the Geneva Protocol or the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, those treaties explicitly exclude non-restricted use of chemicals from the definition of chemical weapons, and they explicitly state the ban does not apply to law enforcement use of riot control agents in dealing with domestic riot control purposes. Next slide, please. Now I'd like to talk about the robust framework and restrictions that exist under Oregon Revised Statute 181A701. That placed on the use of tear gas for crowd management for public order purposes. Law enforcement agencies are currently prohibited from using tear gas except when the use is objectively reasonable to defend against a threat to life or serious bodily injury to any individual, or to bring an objectively dangerous situation safely and effectively under control. In those 2 limited circumstances, the state law requires that a commanding officer authorize the use, that the agency has attempted de-escalation techniques or other alternatives to force when reasonable, and that those have failed, and that the law enforcement agency has announced the intent to use tear gas, allowed sufficient time for individuals to evacuate the area, and announced a second time the agency's intent to use tear gas immediately before using tear gas. Then and only then can tear gas be used. State law also outlines actions required by law enforcement agencies during and following the use of tear gas. Agencies are required, when safe and possible to do so, to minimize the incidental impact to bystanders, medical personnel, journalists, and other unintended targets. Law enforcement agencies are required to notify local emergency rooms of the types of tear gas that were used and to clean up visible debris within a reasonable amount of time. One of the questions we've gotten from elected officials is, what is an objectively dangerous situation under state law? The short answer is the statute is new enough the courts have not weighed in on that definition, but I would point to the arson at the Justice Center here in Portland 2020 as one example example, where individuals broke into the front office area of the Justice Center and lit fires while the building was occupied by hundreds of city and county employees as well as adults in custody. The fires themselves may not have posed an immediate threat of death or serious physical injury, but timely suppression efforts prevented those fires becoming— from becoming life-threatening. I'd also point to the January 6th breach of the U.S. Capitol as another example of a situation that was objectively dangerous. Of note, during the January 6th during the January 6th incident, U.S. Capitol Police did not deploy tear gas, which likely led to the subsequent use of deadly force on a protester who attempted to breach House chambers. Post-incident reviews concluded the use of tear gas could have possibly changed that outcome. When the Metropolitan D.C. Police arrived on scene that day, they did deploy tear gas, which led to many people dispersing from the area. Next slide, please. On top of state law, Bureau policy and practices place additional safeguards on the use of chemical munitions. Directive 63510 requires the Bureau designate a specially trained crowd management incident commander for events that are anticipated to have the potential to become a civil disturbance or riot. The CMIC is the only person who can authorize the deployment of the rapid response team, which brings the capability to use chemical munitions. It also requires that members attempt to distinguish between persons engaged in criminal behavior and those persons who are peacefully protesting. It also requires members to use intervention tactics like individual arrest. Arrests to attempt to de-escalate the situation without interfering with those who are lawfully protesting. It also requires specific instructions for dispersal orders, such as directions, street names, or landmarks. The incident commander is also required to consider proximity to residential areas, hospitals, schools, and freeways. This requirement is designed to reduce the likelihood of higher-risk deployments of the tool where vulnerable populations, bystanders, or motorists would be impacted. Directive 1010 also places additional prohibitions on the use of less lethal force, including tear gas, on vulnerable populations, specifically children under 15, pregnant persons, or medically fragile persons. All use of less lethal force is required to be documented under our use of force reporting processes and reviewed by the chain of command. Next slide, please. So what's different since 2020, aside from state law? Following 2020, the Bureau underwent internal reflections as well as external reviews by a number of organizations, including the Department of Justice, Justice, the Independent Monitor LLC, Independent Police Review, and others. We engage with some of our most vocal critics, including community groups, the ACLU, plaintiffs' attorneys, and journalists. We also engage with academics and industry leaders to identify evidence-based practices and to develop industry standards. I'm particularly proud of the work we've done around dialogue policing in consultation with Professor Clifford Stott. All of this, combined with updates to state law and policy, has resulted in the Bureau again So what does this look like in practice? First, we've shifted from viewing unpermitted demonstrations and protests as inherently risky events, which in the past sometimes led to enforcement actions for offenses that were not directly tied to objective safety risks. We've now taken the approach of facilitating events when we can and using dialogue liaison officers to build connections and trust before events begin and to de-escalate and negotiate resolutions during events. So what does events this look like in practice? When we see objective safety concerns emerging. If isolated criminal activity does occur, we use our bicycle officers to engage in proportionate and focused intervention strategies, whether that's additional warnings or individual arrests. And lastly, if the criminal conduct or violence becomes widespread and the risks to community or city employees escalate, our rapid response team is prepared to deploy in higher levels of protective equipment with the ability to use less lethal tools or chemical munitions as a last we've invested in higher levels of training and professionalism for our rapid response team members in line with the National Tactical Officers Association public order response standards and with recommendations from the Independent Monitor LLC. Our RRT members now receive over 100 hours of training per year on topics including de-escalation, communication, legal updates, policy decision-making, and the use of force in public order settings. Next slide, please. And now I'll turn it over to Commander Derek Foxworth to discuss the use of chemical munitions by thank you, Councilor.
[01:18:39] Derek Foxworth: Good morning, Council, Community Chair. Thank you for having us and the opportunity to present today. Again, my name is Derek Foxworth, and I currently have the honor of serving as the Central Precinct Commander. I've served as a police officer for the City of Portland for a little over 23 years now, and over half of that time has been dedicated to the Special Emergency Reaction Team, or CERT for short, which is our tactical team, more commonly referred to as the SWAT team. I share that for a little bit of reference point for my experience with that team. During that time, I've been on several hundred tactical operations as well as over several thousand hours of tactical training. CERT works in close partnership with the communication— or Crisis Negotiation Team, or CNT for short. CERT and CNT provide tactical communication support to our Portland Police patrol officers, as well as investigative units to potentially dangerous situations. In cases where chemical munitions would be deployed, both these teams are overseen by a critical incident commander, and that's a command-level person of captain or above with specific training. As Assistant Chief Schaning mentioned, the authority to deploy chemical munitions is governed by both law and policy specific— our use of force policy, with a governing idea of the force must be reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. The biggest key points in that policy are threat and severity of the crime that we're dealing with. In addition, ORS 181A.708, while specific to crowd management, CERT's use of chemical munitions is in line with that guidance from Oregon law. Thank you. Additional guidance is found in our PPB Directive 1015, which is less lethal weapons, and Direct 720, which specifically authorizes a critical incident commander on the CERT and CNT side of the house to authorize the deployment of chemical munitions. Additionally, we look to the National Tactical Officers Association, which has created standards and practices from across the nation as best practices, and the ability to have and utilize chemical munitions under certain circumstances is a best practice. CERT's role, uh, serves in a couple different capacities. One, as I mentioned earlier, to assist patrol with a variety of calls, including an armed person who is barricaded inside a structure. That could be a single-family residence, that could be an apartment, or that could be a vehicle. Additionally, CERT is asked to respond to area searches for armed individuals such as we experienced earlier this year when we had 2 Portland police officers shot and that individual fled into a residential neighborhood. Hostage situations, sniper situations, and active violence situations such as the active shooter that the city of Bend experienced a week ago, that would be a type of incident that CERT would respond to. Our thoughts, hearts, and prayers are obviously with the community in Bend, Oregon. Additionally, CERT assists our investigative units for locating and arresting armed, potentially dangerous individuals, as well as providing search warrant service as well. Next slide, please. The decision to deploy chemical munitions is not one that we take lightly, and I want to stress this next point significantly. Chemical munitions in the tactical environment is not just a less lethal option, not just a de-escalation option, but is a life-saving tool. Chemical munitions provide CERT with an option for resolving dangerous situations without forcing officers into proximity with a potentially armed and uncooperative person. Its value is that it can create a compelling reason for an individual to leave a fortified and defensible position and come to officers. This allows officers to maintain distance, to maintain cover, and a tactical advantage. While giving the individual an opportunity to surrender. This can prevent the need for a physical or lethal confrontation. Chemical munitions is a part of a planned response. We work towards containment. That's going to be containing the individual that we've been called to assist with. That also prevents uninvolved parties from moving into the affected area. If we're considering the deployment of chemical munitions, we work towards evacuation of others that may be impacted. Thank you. I mentioned earlier our communication team. We work towards communication. Most law enforcement events, including patrol and tactical operations, resolve through communication. We'll work with our C&T team to determine the nature and quality of those communications. Have they been able to establish them? Have they been able to establish rapport, which leads towards potential influence and ultimately potentially a peaceful surrender? We want to make sure that we have officers ready to receive someone. That's going to be our custody team. That's so officers are physically ready to take someone into custody. As I mentioned earlier, we consider the threat level and the crimes committed. We consider hostages, victims, and officer safety, and an individual's access to weapons. And then we also consider, has this individual already fired shots? The other option when we are We are discussing chemical weapons as a— or chemical munitions as a— in response to what we would refer to as an immediate action. So in a circumstance where police officers are actively being shot at, we would look to potentially deploy chemical munitions to degrade that person's ability to shoot at police officers and fire rounds into the community. The slide with numbers on there, we were asked to provide some high-level information about how often this tool is So we looked at the last 5 years going back to January of 2021. During that timeframe, we had approximately 975 operations where CERT was called to assist. And out of those 975 operations, 30 of those operations we deployed chemical munitions. I do want to point out that in most of those instances, there would've been multiple applications. So I don't want you to think that it's only been 30 that have actually been deployed, but it was 30 of those operations. Thank you. So again, that's roughly about 3% of our operations where CERT has been deployed where we utilize chemical munitions. Additionally, it was asked what does this cost the city. There on the slide you can see that it's a little bit over $16,000 a year. I would expect as things continue to increase in cost, we could see that cost as well. Next slide, please. I think case studies are an important tool to understand kind of the context and circumstances around when when we would be considering the utilization of chemical munitions. One example was a case that took place in August of 2023, and it took place in East Portland, approximately Northeast 165th and Northeast Gleason Street. This was a stolen vehicle that eluded police officers. Police officers used intervention techniques and ultimately boxed in this vehicle. After the vehicle was stopped, the individual was seen with a handgun threatened to shoot himself and the police. CERT and C&T were activated and responded to the scene. The suspect vehicle was completely surrounded by police vehicles. C&T attempted communication strategies. The suspect said multiple times he would shoot the first police officer he was able to see. During this event, the individual was seen actively drinking alcohol, smoking what was believed to be methamphetamine, and injecting himself with an unknown substance. Additionally, he was armed with an axe, a taser, and claimed to have an AR-15 in the vehicle. During this event, he duct taped a handgun to his hand. C&T continued to work through negotiations, were able to get this individual to untape the gun from their hand, but refused to exit the vehicle. If you're familiar with this area, to the south is an apartment complex, to the north is a residential area as well. Ultimately, chemical munitions were deployed and suspect exited the vehicle and was taken into custody without injury. This incident was very close to becoming an officer-involved shooting. Another case study was from earlier this year in Southwest Portland, where an individual broke into a home. The homeowner informed police that there were several firearms inside the residence, including rifles, shotguns, and handguns. CNT worked through numerous negotiation strategies. However, the suspect refused to comply. After extensive negotiations, chemical munitions were introduced to prevent the individual from accessing the bedroom where the handguns, rifles, and shotguns were located. After the introduction of chemical munitions, the suspect quickly surrendered without injury. Next slide.
[01:27:33] Franz Schaning: Now I want to turn to a different question, not whether tear gas can cause harm, which we've acknowledged it can, But whether removing it makes anyone safer. Again, looking at data like litigation costs or payouts can feel uncomfortable when we're talking about the use of force and potential harms to community members, but it does provide some objective measurement of the risk posed by different force tools. This conversation isn't unique to Portland or to chemical agents. The table in front of you looks at comparable costs of civil judgments, claims, and settlements related to the use of force in cities that use force tools other than tear gas in 2020. Even though Portland paid claims related to the use of chemical munitions in addition to other types of force, I tried to select comparable cities whose settlements are attributed to impact munitions, batons, pepper spray, or kettling, not tear gas, so it isn't muddied by cases where chemical agents were also part of the claim. Austin paid out $27 million, more than Portland's entire protest litigation total, almost entirely over serious injuries caused by beanbag and impact rounds— skull fractures, a lost eye, brain damage, And never deployed tear gas. New York City paid $13 million over the use of batons, pepper spray, and kettling. Los Angeles, $12 million over impact munitions as well. For context, several other cities also paid substantially, between $6 and $14 million, but tear gas was also named in those cases, and I wasn't able to break out the cost by force type. I'd also point out those payouts don't track with how much unrest each city dealt with. In Austin, those injuries behind that $27 million payout Next slide, please. Portland, by contrast, had over 100 consecutive nights of nightly protest activity, with at least 25 of those officially being declared riots. Moving away from chemical munitions doesn't make community members or city employees safer. It just moves that risk into cases with potentially more serious injuries. Next slide, please. We also had this conversation in 2020 during a series of court rulings and mayoral actions that restricted the use of CS gas and tear gas. When the ordinance passed, police bureau leadership and members highlighted the increased risk of injuries to community members and police officers, and that warning bore true in notable force incidents and injuries that followed. Seattle also had a similar policy debate in 2020. When the city passed an ordinance restricting the use of less lethal tools for public order, the Seattle Police Department's leadership highlighted the increased risks posed by other force options. I would note the city of Seattle at the time was under consent decree with the Department of Justice, and they were sued for attempting to amend force practices outside the consent decree framework. Thank you. The federal judge issued a restraining order preventing the city ordinance from taking effect, in part citing those other force tools and the risks they posed. This issue is also not unique to the United States. Western European democratic countries have a patchwork of tear gas restrictions, bans, and a history of usage. Almost all countries in the European Union allow the use of tear gas to address violent protests or riots. The following are a couple of notable comparisons. In Sweden, In Sweden, the home of the dialogue policing model, prior to 2012, tear gas was prohibited for outdoor use in public order events. In 2001, during the EU summit in Gothenburg, police encountered violent protests and eventually escalated to the use of live fire, striking at least 3 protesters. There was a policy debate following that incident, and in 2012, Sweden passed new rules allowing police to use tear gas in outdoor public order settings. In the Netherlands, in Rotterdam, in November '21, in 2021, Dutch police facing violent COVID lockdown protesters also escalated to using live fire against protesters. 7 people were injured. The takeaway here is that a tear gas ban doesn't remove the risk of harm to community or city employees. It relocates that risk, risk from a proportionate area-based response with a tool that carries relatively low risk of harm and on to higher-risk tools, up to and including firearms, to deal with dangerous situations. The question is not if Portland will eventually see serious disorder again. I think that's a good point. The question is when, and when that time comes, what expectations will we have for our first responders? Preparedness and training plays a major role in answering that question. If a tear gas ban is passed, we'll lose that capability to use chemical munitions, and that decision cannot be undone quickly. The Bureau would have to rebuild that capability from the ground up, retraining and recertifying officers who deploy those munitions and the incident commanders who authorize them to standards under state law and our own directives. Those training requirements are substantial, and rebuilding that capacity would take several months. In the interim, we would be left with force options that carry substantially more risk. Next slide, please. One of the more concerning risks created by a potential ban on chemical munitions is a threat to our fragile mutual aid relationships for both public order events and critical incidents. We depend on our mutual aid partners like the Oregon State Police and the Multnomah County Sheriff's Office to manage complex public order events. Events and to provide coverage for our tactical team when they are unavailable. Those relationships broke down in 2020 when then-Mayor Wheeler banned the use of CS gas for crowd management. In response, both the Oregon State Police and Multnomah County Sheriff's Office refused to send mutual aid for public order events. OSP Superintendent Travis Hampton said removing this tool would force officers to insert physical bodies between violent crowds, increasing the risk of serious injury or death. Sheriff Reese pointed out the ban left PPB with no sound tactical options to disperse a dangerous this culminated in then-Governor Kate Brown declaring a state of emergency in Portland and taking over responsibility for policing a far-right rally in Delta Park the weekend of September 25th of that year. The independent monitor's assessment following 2020 made rebuilding our mutual aid network its very first recommendation. Second, there's a separate tactical-specific mutual aid risk specific to CERT. East Metro SWAT is the only neighboring tactical team with a current mutual aid agreement with the City of Portland. Thank you. Partner agencies have indicated that agreement would be in jeopardy under a tear gas ban. They've told us they would not assist CERT or our community, citing the liability exposure it would create for their own agencies and personnel. Without that backup, our CERT team would have no outside tactical resources for a significant event spanning multiple operational periods, and our own operators would require to be— would be required to always be on call with no relief. Next slide, please. I said at the start of the presentation I'd come back to the federal conduct at South Waterfront at the ICE facility because I believe, I believe that's what's at the heart of our community's current concerns. And to be clear, city legislation will have no impact on that problematic behavior, and I believe will actually make the community and our city employees demonstrably less safe by reducing the police bureau's ability to safely manage public order events, including outside the ICE facility. I do want to point to the progress that has been made in restraining federal actions at the ICE facility. In State of Oregon versus Trump, the case over the president's attempt to deploy the National Guard here, PPB members provided declarations and testimony documenting the ICE facility protests were small and we were capable of handling those protests without federal or military interventions. The court relied heavily on that testimony in blocking the deployment permanently on November 7th. Part of the basis for the testimony in that case, that the Portland Police Bureau could handle those protests without the National Guard, was the testimony of PPB members. Thank you. Was the knowledge we had access to the appropriate tools and to mutual aid if a situation turned dangerous. A ban would potentially undercut our ability to manage protest events going forward and increase the risk of federal or military intervention. Again, a city ordinance doesn't bind federal agents. Litigation has twice. Next slide. Our conclusions and recommendations are straightforward. First, don't override the state's thoughtfully calibrated framework with a local ban that actually increases risk to community members and our city employees and will impact our ability to request mutual aid resources. Next, I'd ask you to consider the practical challenges before passing a tear gas ban. The previous mask ban ordinance hasn't changed federal officers' actions and has been stalled for months because of labor bargaining considerations. It has now also resulted in a federal lawsuit. A tear gas ban would face those same challenges but also additional ones. A tear gas ban removes an authorized use of force tool outright right, but creates complications because an incident commander is required to approve that tool under state law and Bureau policy. It also will potentially raise challenges from the Department of Justice as it relates to the settlement agreement. We recommend you preserve the Bureau's narrow ability to use chemical munitions to address the most dangerous situations and our ability to assert our position in court proceedings that the City of Portland is capable of managing public order events in our jurisdiction and that federal intervention is unnecessary. However, despite our belief that a ban on chemical munitions is unwise, we're prepared to work with council on measures that strengthen accountability without eliminating a tool— limiting a tool that state law, our own policy, and this city's own history all show reduces the risk of serious injury during a civil disturbance. That includes more specific post-cleanup coordination requirements, including protocols that specifically address stormwater drains near deployment sites, partnering with medical professionals to ensure our embedded are specifically prepared to treat acute medical respiratory conditions that could arise from the use of tear gas, and finding ways to codify the Bureau's current approach to facilitation of First Amendment events, to dialogue policing, and to focused interventions. Thank you. Again, I want to express our sincere appreciation for allowing us to provide you with information on this important policy discussion. I recognize the challenging moment we're in and the need to collaborate on solutions that keep Portlanders safe Council Chair, Vice Chair—.
[01:36:46] Steve Novick: I'm sorry, Committee Chair, Vice Chair, and members of the Committee of the Whole. I'm Brian Hughes, the Deputy Chief of the Portland Police Bureau. I first want to thank you for the invitation to come and make this presentation today. I really appreciate the opportunity that we were able to come and join with thank you, Council President Jamie Dunphy. Thank you, Deputy City Attorney Nancy Thorington. I want to leave you with one final thought. When this issue eventually comes before you for a decision, I ask that you consider it through the lens of the sanctity of human life. Our responsibility to protect life does not go away when you remove a less lethal tool. When lives are in danger, our officers still have a duty to act. Removing chemical munitions takes away an option that has allowed us to resolve dangerous situations without serious injury or the loss of human life. I believe the sanctity of human life must remain at the center of this discussion. Any future decision to eliminate this tool must account for the greater risks that could result, not only to our officers, but to the very people we are sworn to protect. Thank you.
[01:37:50] Sameer Kanal: Thank you all to all of our presenters. Colleagues, please feel free to get into the queue. Um, we have some time for questions. What I'm going to ask everyone to do is just be as concise as possible. That applies to everybody here, um, just so we can keep this moving. We do have testimony later on. We'll take a break in a little while as well. Um, but as folks get in the queue, we'll just, we'll just get going. Um, and, uh, I'll kick it off with Councilor Avalos.
[01:38:18] Candace Avalos: All right, thank you for your presentation, for taking the time to share your perspective on this, and I wanted to provide a little bit of context for the questions I'm about to ask. So before joining the council, I chaired the Citizen Review Committee and its Crowd Control and Use of Force Workgroup. Following the 2020 protests, we conducted a substantial review of PPB's crowd management practices, and we gathered community testimony, reviewed bureau policies, spoke with PPB leadership, and produced a report with detailed recommendations. One of our central findings was that the use of chemical weapons raised serious concerns about precision, proportionality, and harm to people who were not engaged in threatening behavior. We recommended making the ban on CS gas permanent and extending restrictions to other chemical weapons used in crowd management. So this is an issue that I've been working on for years with community, and I'm interested in understanding how the Bureau views the changes that have occurred since then. So on slides 8 and 9, you walk through the legislative changes and restrictions that followed 2020. And the Bureau has emphasized that it hasn't used tear gas for crowd management since 2020, and that is something I definitely appreciate. When we wrote our report, we were specifically calling for stronger legal and policy restrictions because we believed those boundaries were necessary to prevent the kinds of harm that we documented. So looking back at the last several years, what role do you believe those stronger restrictions played in changing PPB's crowd management practices?
[01:39:49] Franz Schaning: So I'll try to tackle that. Councilor Avalos, thank you for the question, and I appreciate the work you put into that report. I did read the report. It was part of the ongoing conversation between state law changes or the Department of Justice settlement agreement policy updates. We did account for that as well. To your question, I think it's important to note that we have not seen any increase in our criminal justice cases. The changes to state law are not the only thing we've done differently. I think, again, we recognize the trauma that the community went through. That included for our city employees, our police officers, because of how unprepared we were for 2020. So as we looked at national practices, again, leading into the facilitation of First Amendment events, the dialogue-led approach, and really honing the ability to go in and address individuals engaged in criminal activity and not treat the event as unlawful or a civil disturbance and disperse people who are engaged in lawful, peaceful assembly because of the acts of so I would say those actions, more than anything else, have eliminated our need to potentially use chemical munitions in a public order setting. The state law is absolutely a floor, a framework that raised the bar for us since 2020, but our practices are what have allowed us to operate in the space above and beyond that. I'm particularly proud of that work that we've done with Professor Clifford Stott. I think, you know, the crowd science has demonstrated that the use of chemical munitions, even if it's necessary in the moment, I think using a tool that, frankly, when you've got a crowd of several hundred people and there's 6 or 10 or 15 or 20, whatever it is, engaged in violence or criminal activity, the rest of the people don't understand why the police are coming in to take action, particularly when using a force tool like chemical munitions. So I guess I don't know if that answers your question. I would say our practices have gone beyond and above state law.
[01:41:35] Eric Schaffner: I think it's a good question.
[01:41:41] Kaleigh Roehl: Okay.
[01:41:41] Candace Avalos: So our report also recommended that PPB move away from tactics that affect entire crowds and toward more individualized proportional responses. Today, what we're hearing is that additional restrictions on chemical weapons could limit the bureau's operational options. But given the changes PPB has already made, what specific evidence demonstrates that further restrictions would make situations more dangerous for the public? I think that's a great question.
[01:42:10] Franz Schaning: Sure, so I'll take that one as well. You know, I think, as I said, we've leaned into these practices to try and differentiate how we deal with criminal behavior in a crowd context. I think we still believe there may come a time when the situation is so dangerous that trying to use those individualized differentiated tactics won't work, and we may need to still have that tool available to us for those worst-case scenarios. Does that answer your question?
[01:42:39] Candace Avalos: I mean, it answers it in that that's what you believe, but what is the evidence that you have to demonstrate that?
[01:42:47] Franz Schaning: Well, I guess I would point to— fortunately, here in Portland, we haven't had a protest that has gone— that has escalated to the level of a civil disturbance or a riot. I don't think we've ever declared a riot aside from the brief time during the summer of last year down at the ICE facility. I think we declared a riot one night down there, if I'm not mistaken. But I'd point to other countries that also have leaned into some of these approaches, dialogue-led approaches, facilitated approaches, including some of the European countries where this evidence-based practice came from. And they're still using chemical munitions when those dangerous situations happen, when the event escalates beyond the ability or the capacity to manage it with the other resources or tools or strategy or tactics that are available. So I would say internationally we look at it and it's still happening occasionally, even in countries or cities that have done the best they can to manage those events and de-escalate them.
[01:43:40] Candace Avalos: Okay, thank you for your answers. I'll pause there and I'll hop back in the queue for some more.
[01:43:44] Steve Novick: Thank you, Councilor Avalos. We'll go to Councilor Novick, followed by Councilor Koyama Lane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chief Schenning, could you give like examples of the kind of situations where the use of munitions might be, you know, appropriate? Like, I don't know, a situation where a whole bunch of people in a crowd are throwing rocks and you can't figure out which one it is, or other things that you have actually seen in places?
[01:44:10] Franz Schaning: Sure. So I appreciate the question, Councilor Novick, and again, it's a little tough to give you a fact pattern that's going to answer that question neatly. I guess I would point to you know, the Justice Center on May 29th, 2020, as an example where, you know, I'm not saying that that was the way we wanted that incident to be resolved, that we used chemical munitions in that moment to try and move people away from the building to allow our firefighters to access the building and extinguish those fires that could potentially have escalated to a life-threatening situation in a high-rise building with adults in custody and city and county employees. Fire extinguisher. You know, again, I think our ability to use differentiated tactics to arrest the individuals who were involved in that criminal activity. We lacked that, and we've got that capability now. So I would say even in those moments where, you know, we would want to arrest a handful of people engaged in criminal activity and we would use time to de-escalate and provide announcements to try and convince people to comply and move away from that building, it may still be necessary in those situations if we can't get compliance using de-escalation, using warnings, giving time, and trying to take a more differentiated approach, at the end of the day, if that building's on fire, we may still have to use chemical munitions to get there and resolve that issue before, again, we lose lives.
[01:45:26] Sameer Kanal: Just before you keep going, sorry to interrupt you, just for everyone in the audience, we do allow nonverbal reactions— thumbs ups, thumbs down, some of you have signs, whatever— but we ask that folks not interrupt just so that we can continue on. Anything that causes this to slow down does reduce the time for, um, public comment at the end. So ask just for folks to, to bear with those rules, please. Sorry, Councilor Novick, carry on. Okay, uh, Councilor Koyama Lane, then Councilor Green.
[01:45:56] Tiffany Koyama Lane: Thank you, Chair. Thank you for this presentation and for being here. Um, I have a couple questions as we try to understand— as I'm trying to understand terminology and what the law is. Can someone speak to or describe nerve agents, blister agents, choking agents, and blood agents? Are those the same as tear gas? What are they? Are they permitted to be used by law enforcement? I generally don't know the answer.
[01:46:25] Franz Schaning: I, I'm not an expert in international law or military weapons. What you've described, I believe, would be actual chemical weapons used by— or I guess prohibited those are not tear gas. Tear gas is generally, strictly speaking, CS gas or a version of OC or oleocapsicum chemical irritants.
[01:46:49] Tiffany Koyama Lane: So none of those are permitted to be used by our law enforcement?
[01:46:52] Franz Schaning: No. Okay.
[01:46:55] Tiffany Koyama Lane: And then my understanding is that the clinical science regarding health harms of chemical weapons is not clear. Thank you. I know that the use of tear gas in Portland has changed as new research emerges, and new— there's new research showing potential harms to adults with a uterus. Recent research demonstrates the correlation between tear gas to uterine bleeding, cramping, miscarriages. Can you talk more about how you're tracking and incorporating, like, scientific evidence like that into the evaluation of using tear gas?
[01:47:31] Franz Schaning: Yeah, thank you for that question. And as I noted before, we have women on both our specialized reaction team, special emergency reaction team, and our rapid response team. So reproductive health is at the core of our concerns for our employees and also the community. You know, when it comes to research that's ongoing and developing, we consistently look out there to see what research is available. As we continually reevaluate these tools, we attend conferences, where industry practices are discussed, including, you know, evidence-based studies and conclusions. So we continue to monitor it, we'll continue to do that, and as the, the body of information develops, we'll be paying attention.
[01:48:12] Tiffany Koyama Lane: So it sounds like there's tracking but maybe not incorporating yet and change— making any changes?
[01:48:19] Franz Schaning: No changes yet. I think you know, I'd certainly question in my mind about, you know, have we done enough to pay attention to the employees, to our city employees' health and wellness? They are exposed to chemical munitions as part of their training and in ongoing deployments. So questions about do we need to do better there? Beyond that, I think, as we've acknowledged, chemical munitions do carry risk. You know, that's why the threshold is so high, is why we use them so sparingly. So to a certain extent, you know, the question of when the body of evidence becomes so compelling that we have to change practices is a little bit of a gray area. But all I can tell you is that we continually reevaluate it, and we look at case law that's out there. The courts also weigh in on the harms or risks posed by less lethal tools and provide guidance for police on, you know, what level of, as Commander Foxworth said, threat or severity of the offense, the type of incident we're dealing with, the totality of the circumstances. Does a less lethal tool carry so much risk that it's not appropriate for those situations? And that also guides our actions. Okay, thank you. You're welcome.
[01:49:28] Sameer Kanal: Thank you. We're going to go to Councilor Green and then we're going to take our break.
[01:49:32] Mitch Green: Thank you, Councilor Kanal, Chair Kanal. Thank you so much for being here today and providing a comprehensive briefing. My questions are going to shift towards sort of the environmental stuff, so I think they'll probably be directed either to CA Lee, or what's your name again, sir?
[01:49:46] Matthew Cribley: Matthew Kribbley.
[01:49:47] Mitch Green: Matthew, and BES. So just straight away, I know we regulate sort of chemicals in the waterways. Like, which hazardous chemicals are allowed to be discharged into storm drains? Do we allow any?
[01:50:02] Matthew Cribley: No, not at all. Okay. I mean, there's— I'll preface that with there's background urban stormwater that comes from cars, Lead, copper, zinc, all of those kinds of things are common stormwater pollutants in our storm system.
[01:50:17] Mitch Green: Those are sort of incidental impacts of just the general society of things, but we don't permit anything to be intentionally released?
[01:50:27] Matthew Cribley: Everything else would be a prohibited discharge.
[01:50:29] Mitch Green: Thank you. So then I think, You know, I hear a lot from advocates. I have constituents who live down in the South Waterfront. I know that— I acknowledge that we can't regulate the federal government, but it's an acute experience that folks have. And so one of the things I hear from advocates is that the chemicals found in the new modern tear gas being used by those feds is much more harmful today than it was in 2020. In your expert opinion, or Mr. Lee, if you know, do you believe that the risk of the chemical impacts on stormwater are the same today as they were in 2020?
[01:51:11] Matthew Cribley: We have not looked at the material safety data sheets from the most recent. I will also say that we have practices in place, and I'm not too concerned about it getting to our storm system or getting through our storm system and into the river. Because we have pollution prevention practices in place that would prevent them from moving.
[01:51:35] Mitch Green: Okay, thank you. And then, so then if we were to do that study again, do you think that those results would hold? Basically, are you confident the 2020 study would produce the same results if we did it in the next tear gas event?
[01:51:51] Matthew Cribley: I think it would be consistent. I think 2020 was the worst case, I mean, I would hope it would be the worst case scenario, maybe not, but I would hope it would be the worst case scenario in that we had no practices in place that would minimize the amount of tear gas that would enter our system, any of the residuals, and the concentrations would probably be consistently the same at the epicenter and likely taper off before it hit the outfalls. So I don't think that would change. As you mentioned, maybe the constituents would change, but we have— again, we have the practices in place, and I think we're better prepared this time than we were in 2020.
[01:52:44] Mitch Green: Okay, thank you for that. And so then that sort of transitions to just a few, and I'm trying to be mindful of time here, so I may I'll sort of transition to the theme of slide 6, which is really sort of what BS has done now to protect the storm system. And I'll direct this question to City Administrator Lee, actually, because I think that you're more appropriate for this. Do we believe that the— do we have a reason to expect that the feds will tear gas us again? I know that's a bit speculative, but do you have any thoughts on that?
[01:53:17] Unidentified speaker: I was going to say that's very speculative to answer that question. I don't know. Uh, I think in situations where, uh, the feds feel like there's any sense of threat to their assets or their facilities, uh, they hold the right to do that, uh, from their perspective.
[01:53:38] Mitch Green: Okay, um, I appreciate that. And then, so, but we don't BES doesn't— we don't grant the federal government preemptive authorization to emit hazardous chemicals into our waterways.
[01:53:50] Unidentified speaker: No way, shape, form, or fashion.
[01:53:51] Mitch Green: Okay.
[01:53:53] Matthew Cribley: And we don't offer permits.
[01:53:55] Mitch Green: I mean, do we use permits as a regulation tool for this? Are there any cases where we would use a permit to say you can emit this substance?
[01:54:03] Matthew Cribley: No.
[01:54:04] Unidentified speaker: Okay. All right.
[01:54:08] Mitch Green: And then I think the last question I'll have, and I want to keep space for others, is, you know, there is a cost to this, and we've acknowledged that in the presentation. How much, just on average, how much does the catch basin insert cost? Do we have a sense?
[01:54:24] Matthew Cribley: So since May of '25, when we installed catch basins, we inspect those weekly to make sure they're still in place and they're the integrity is still there. We also have flushed the streets twice, once or twice, I don't remember the number now, to remove our chemical weapon, chemical munition residuals off the street. Total costs were $28,000 over a year and a half. I don't— the, the the cost of a filter is like $200. Maintaining that and protecting the system over time is about $28,000 over a year and a half.
[01:55:15] Mitch Green: So we— do we switch that out after every event? Does it last more than one event?
[01:55:21] Matthew Cribley: Yeah, it lasts quite some time. We only remove it if it's been punctured or anything like that. So it can okay.
[01:55:34] Mitch Green: Um, so, so the bulk of that cost is, is staff time, overhead?
[01:55:38] Matthew Cribley: Correct.
[01:55:39] Mitch Green: Okay. I, I think I'll leave it there, Chair, for now. And, uh, thanks for engaging my questions, even if they are speculative, but it's important to ask these. Thanks.
[01:55:49] Sameer Kanal: Thank you, Councilor Green. We're going to take a short break, um, and come back at 11:31. I do note that I've wrote down the, the councilors who are in the queue for public testimony. And we'll keep that order in place. See you back at 11:31. Thank you. All right, thank you. We are coming back into session. I'll give everybody a couple seconds to sit down before I pass it to Councilor Murillo.
[02:07:28] Angelita Morillo: All right, so we'll go to Councilor Murillo followed by Councilor sorry, they make us have these really long passwords on our computers, which is very good. Thank you, BTS. Thank you all so much for being here today to answer questions for us. I think it's a really important discussion for us to have, especially during such a difficult time. And I think I also have questions that are probably going to be more geared towards BTS.
[02:08:01] Unidentified speaker: Yes.
[02:08:01] Angelita Morillo: Or I'm not— not BTS, BES, and the city administrator. So, um, might need to wait a minute for him to come back as well. Um, and, and I appreciate the steps that the bureau has taken as far as how the city uses force and how the city uses tear gas. Um, but I, I guess I do just have to say, and I, and I understand that things are a bit different than they were in 2020, But I do just want to say that when we're talking about how tear gas was deployed, a lot of the presentation talks about addressing these really violent, scary crowds. And as someone who did witness middle-aged white women who were singing in the street in the Wall of Moms getting tear gassed because they were singing in a crowd, a group that is historically not targeted by the police, I do want to challenge that framing a little bit about how our tear gas is actually used. And I'm not saying that because I think middle-aged white women should be uniquely protected. I'm saying that because, uh, even they were not preserved from harm during that time. Um, so I, I just want to ground us in that again because many of us witnessed that firsthand. Um, is anyone here from Public Works able to answer some of our questions? Oh, okay.
[02:09:22] Sameer Kanal: That's correct.
[02:09:23] Angelita Morillo: Um, I'm, I'm curious on the— on how much Public spent on mitigating and preventing the discharge of tear gas into the stormwater system in 2025 and 2026, if you know?
[02:09:36] Matthew Cribley: So yeah, that was the $28,600 that we spent installing catch basin filters, flushing the street, inspecting, a lot of staff time. But yeah, since May to, May of 2005 till present, it's right around 28,000.
[02:09:59] Angelita Morillo: Okay, and we as the city, we have the ability to use the Clean Water Act to try to hold federal agencies accountable if they use excessive tear gas as well, is that correct?
[02:10:10] Matthew Cribley: We have city code which is based on our, our permits which apply by the Clean Water Act. So we can use city code, if that's what you're asking, which we do.
[02:10:29] Angelita Morillo: Yeah, so, so you're saying it is legally permissible for the City of Portland to regulate and enforce against the federal government through the Clean Water Act? Maybe that's a city attorney question.
[02:10:37] Matthew Cribley: I think that's probably a city attorney.
[02:10:38] Unidentified speaker: That's the city attorney who'll have to weigh in on that.
[02:10:51] Sameer Kanal: You, uh, Councilor Murillo, thank you for the questions. Mike Bore with the City Attorney's Office. I also have my colleague Eric Schaffner here who advises, uh, BES on these issues, and so it might be a 2-part answer from 2 attorneys.
[02:11:03] Unidentified speaker: Uh, my understanding is that yes, the—.
[02:11:06] Sameer Kanal: Through the codification that, uh, Matthew just spoke of, that the city has the ability to regulate the pollution caused by tear gas by the okay, does that seem accurate to you?
[02:11:17] Angelita Morillo: Anything else you want to add?
[02:11:22] Eric Schaffner: Good morning, Eric Schaffner, City Attorney's Office. Uh, the Clean Water Act, uh, has an explicit carve-out that says that, uh, the federal government is subject to regulations the same as anybody else, uh, including reasonable service charges for, for that enforcement. So What Matt was talking about was, you know, the city does not enforce the Clean Water Act, but the city code provisions that he's referring to essentially implement those aspects of the Clean Water Act that apply to the city.
[02:11:52] Angelita Morillo: Gotcha. And so as a follow-up to that, is there anything in the city code that requires that the city investigate and regulate polluters who threaten compliance with the Clean Water Act?
[02:12:03] Eric Schaffner: Well, the city code always, you know, reserves a certain amount of discretion to the administration. Right. But in general, you know, there— if there's a violation of the code, and it is expected that there will be at least some kind of investigation and potentially enforcement action taken.
[02:12:20] Angelita Morillo: Okay. So in a time where we're cutting a lot of programs at the city and struggling to find— to fund core services, And we're raising ratepayers' rates and renters' utility bills. Has the Public Works area tried to do anything to, you know, hold folks accountable so that we can get some sort of cost remediation for the burden that we pay?
[02:12:53] Matthew Cribley: We can use cost recovery. We could assess charges for that. What I would say is right now, Right. Using catch basin inserts and inspections is a really cost-effective way of managing that. It's, again, it's about $200 for a filter that we replace every few months if there's not heavy deployment. If there was heavy deployment, I might think differently. If this was if this looked like 2020, I might consider that differently. But for today, the amount of time and effort we're spending on this is really, really minimal.
[02:13:41] Angelita Morillo: So this past summer when the feds were tear gassing that neighborhood in McAdam almost every single day, you know, as someone who was trying to pass the detention facility impact fee, We didn't have any way to measure, or we were looking for ways to measure the amount of tear gas that was in the air. So we had to work with the county to get machines put in the area to do measurements of the toxicity in the air. But would you say that at the McAdam time last summer, that doesn't qualify as something that we would try to get cost mitigation for?
[02:14:17] Matthew Cribley: So I just want to be clear, is we're looking only at what impacts would be to our collection, our stormwater collection system, not what's in the air. So I don't have any authority over air quality or air impacts. It's strictly what would enter our collection system. Mm-hmm. So there's the costs associated with that where, again, we installed the filter. The filter was, as far as I can tell, it was pretty effective in okay.
[02:14:53] Angelita Morillo: So what I'm hearing is you think that was enough remediation. We don't need to try to necessarily hold the federal government accountable through the Clean Water Act to get some sort of cost compensation back for the work that we had to do.
[02:15:06] Matthew Cribley: I think from what was deployed at that time, I don't think there was a huge impact on our collection system. We flushed the streets once. I don't quite remember if we flushed it once or twice. And that was basically to keep it from getting to our storm system. We didn't necessarily need to do that. We were doing that as more of a proactive measure. So again, there was the costs associated with what the federal government deployed was pretty minimal.
[02:15:40] Angelita Morillo: Okay, thank you. That answers my questions.
[02:15:44] Sameer Kanal: Thank you, colleagues. We'll go to Councilor Pirtle-Guiney and then Councilor Ryan. I, I will just note we'll probably have time for everybody to speak at least once. I don't want to guarantee more than that until we get closer.
[02:15:53] Angelita Morillo: Thanks.
[02:15:55] Elana Pirtle-Guiney: Thank you, Chair. Um, just a couple of questions, and starting with the environmental side, you said that we haven't done another study since 2020. Was there onsite monitoring in 2025 after the filters were inserted to make sure that they were working properly and that the stormwater outputs were still reading at a level that the Bureau felt was not higher than the normal output?
[02:16:28] Matthew Cribley: No, we did not. We, again, we installed the filters. The 2020 study basically informed us that tear gas gets into our system via particulate matter. So it's, it's not in the gas form anymore. So once it's in the particulate matter, then the filters are effective at minimizing anything that gets to our system. So what would be going to our system would be theoretically really minimal. And then again, after 1 or 2 heavy deployments, we flush the street. So even then, we flush the street. What that entails is flushing the street, letting it go through, flush our storm system, blocking it at the outfall, capturing that wastewater that's— and disposing of it. So even if something did get into our system, Right. We removed it, so it would not have impacted the river at that point.
[02:17:32] Elana Pirtle-Guiney: I think what I'm getting at is we assume from what we saw before, from what measures we used, that that would work. Did we do the verification on the back end?
[02:17:42] Matthew Cribley: We did not do additional verification. It would be an expensive endeavor to get back into our system to collect samples, especially if there's not really anything to It might be a consideration, Mr.
[02:17:57] Elana Pirtle-Guiney: City Administrator, if we do have another incident as we did in 2025. I certainly hope we don't. I certainly hope the federal government does not treat our community that way again. But if that does happen, it could be worth consideration of validating our methods and then going down that cost recovery path. Thank you. I understand that the work we do now is around clean water and protecting our water systems. And Mr. City Administrator, maybe this is a question for you, though it might be a question for BES. Do we have a way of addressing clean air impacts similarly? Do we have a way of looking at cost recovery for community harm if we were to put in place the right city codes around keeping our air clean as well?
[02:18:53] Unidentified speaker: I don't believe we have necessary resources as of today to be able to do that. That's something that we'd have to do an assessment of what resources would be needed, because the water quality and the air quality is 2 different mechanisms of tracking, uh, those resources of if anything is polluting those systems. Different training too as well. So we'd have to— I would have to actually sit down with BES and our group with also the county who is tracking this to see what are those resources that are currently being used to track these different mechanisms, but also look at other cities and see how they're doing it as well. Because there are air quality monitors and different things, but there's also staff associated with tracking, researching those things also. Thank you.
[02:19:40] Elana Pirtle-Guiney: I'd be curious to see if there's anything more we could be doing that could lead to some cost recovery for community impact there. Obviously, we passed the detention center facility fee. That helps, but there may be more we can do.
[02:19:52] Eric Schaffner: Councilor, if I may, just real quick. The reason that the city has the authority to take enforcement with regard to Clean Water Act-derived code provisions is because DEQ has delegated a certain amount of that authority to the city.
[02:20:06] Elana Pirtle-Guiney: DEQ has not done that for a clean So we would need something at the state level?
[02:20:10] Eric Schaffner: Correct.
[02:20:11] Elana Pirtle-Guiney: Okay, good to know. I hope some of our state partners realize that. Um, on the PPB side, I do have 2 questions for you all as well. Um, when you issue dispersal warnings, you went through that series of if in the future, um, these these tools were used in a crowd disbursement situation. When you issue those dispersal warnings, how much time functionally is provided there? And what I'm thinking about is, for somebody who is in a crowd and is pregnant, where there is some research on the potential for negative outcomes, do they have time Do they have time to actually get out of the middle of a crowd if they choose to leave? For somebody who has disabilities, do they have time if they are in the middle of that crowd to get out before a choice is made for them?
[02:21:14] Franz Schaning: Sure, great question. And yes, the answer is under state law and under Bureau policy, we're required to give a reasonable amount of time to comply and make accommodations for people with disabilities.
[02:21:24] Elana Pirtle-Guiney: What is a reasonable amount of time? What does that look like on the ground?
[02:21:31] Franz Schaning: Sure. So the decision is largely going to be at the incident commander level. Our CMICs are the ones that authorize the use of chemical munitions, authorize the declaration of a civil disturbance or riot. So we're going to be looking at the totality of the circumstances. We're going to be looking at how large is the crowd, how dense is it, are there avenues for people to leave, have we given clear directions, are we seeing compliance from other members of the crowd. Are we seeing attempts to leave the area? What other exigency is there? If there's nothing exigent in that moment, then, you know, I guess arguably we wouldn't be using chemical munitions. But how exigent are the circumstances that require the use of chemical munitions? So all those things are going to be factored into that decision, and ultimately it will be the CMIC or the crowd management incident commander who makes that decision on has a reasonable amount of time been given, and that decision will be reviewed potentially by internal reviews, civil litigation, a variety of mechanisms.
[02:22:29] Elana Pirtle-Guiney: So help me out.
[02:22:30] Franz Schaning: Sure.
[02:22:31] Elana Pirtle-Guiney: Totality of circumstances, absolutely. Is the crowd starting to disperse? Is it not? But are you talking about a matter of 30 seconds, 2 minutes, 5 minutes? What's—. Give me a sense of scale here. We're not holding you to something that is now a new standard because you said it at a council meeting, but I'm trying to understand a sense of scale for the amount of time we're talking about.
[02:23:00] Franz Schaning: No, I appreciate, uh, your recognition that it is challenging to answer that question, and drawing a static line is difficult, uh, under that totality of the circumstances, um, lens and the objectively reasonable lens. To answer your question, my guess is that no, 30 seconds is not going to be like, it's going to take people time to just process the fact that a dispersal warning or announcement has been given, orient themselves as to what's going on, decide what direction they're going to head, try to understand the directions that were given. Usually those are given over both our long-range acoustic device, or we call sound truck. We also usually send it out via social media in written form so that folks with disabilities out there have at least some way of potentially receiving that dispersal announcement or warning.
[02:23:41] Unidentified speaker: I think that's a good point.
[02:23:42] Franz Schaning: And then actually starting to move. And I think in all that space, generally we'll have hopefully some kind of situational awareness, either officers on the ground observing crowd behavior, or we'll have our plane looking overhead at kind of the crowd movement and density and where people are starting to move. I would say in most circumstances it'll be at least a few minutes, probably several minutes, probably closer to 5, 10 would be where I think a reasonable Uh, person would land. But it is, again, depending on the circumstances.
[02:24:12] Madison Moskowitz: He's lying.
[02:24:13] Brenda Alvarado: I'm sorry, but he's lying.
[02:24:14] Cherice Bock: He doesn't give us more than 30 seconds at a time.
[02:24:17] Sameer Kanal: We're gonna need everyone—.
[02:24:19] Brenda Alvarado: He didn't even care about the children at the labor march. He didn't give us more than an hour.
[02:24:24] Franz Schaning: He didn't even give us a minute.
[02:24:26] Brenda Alvarado: I was there.
[02:24:27] Unidentified speaker: He—.
[02:24:27] Brenda Alvarado: They actually gassed me in the face.
[02:24:32] Rebecca Dobert: Liar!
[02:24:39] Sameer Kanal: Colleagues, we are going to be having public comment on this issue in a few minutes, um, and I want to just make sure that we are able to have everyone have their time. So I appreciate everyone else in the room following that, um, and I'll let you continue.
[02:24:53] Elana Pirtle-Guiney: I do have one more question, if that's all right. I'll be quick.
[02:24:55] Sameer Kanal: You got a little time left.
[02:24:57] Elana Pirtle-Guiney: Um, so I, I appreciate understanding that, and I also recognize that we're We're dealing in hypotheticals because this hasn't been used in a crowd control situation by PPB since 2020, and the standards and the training, it sounds like, have changed significantly since then. So we're, we're talking in hypotheticals, right? And we are, as you say these things, there is, I think, an ask to the community to trust that you mean them when we haven't seen that. And that's, that's hard. That trust is hard. And I think we're hearing some of thank you for that. To that end, though, to that trust end, under the new guidance since 2020, the new laws, the new standards since 2020, does the Bureau plan to release reports after a chemical munition deployment that share the justification why the decision was made, what was used, and what the cleanup mechanisms were afterwards, if any, in order to allow for transparency and to allow for any accountability and changes in policy that your leadership or that this council might need to make.
[02:26:14] Franz Schaning: Totally fair question. I agree with you. Trust is an issue. You know, we believe in the investments we've made in training, in our practices, That we will significantly reduce the instances where we would use chemical munitions in a public order environment. Those uses are reviewed internally. We have a use of force review process, after-action reporting. We do report that information out to city leadership and the city attorney's office as part of that post-event summary around the decision-making. Our critical management— I'm sorry, crowd management incident commanders are required to document their decision-making and the facts they consider. I'm sorry, I'm sorry. I think, you know, we would lean into a conversation about what public reporting would look like or transparency would look like. It would probably be a conversation and consultation with the City Attorney's Office and city administration around what, uh, what types of disinformation or decision-making processes would be releasable and what we're gonna have to protect pending litigation, that those sort of things. So, but we absolutely— I think the chief has demonstrated a desire to bring transparency to every conversation. Thank you. And we would lean into that.
[02:27:18] Elana Pirtle-Guiney: I'd be interested in those conversations, and I would be interested in having information about how much time was given to folks as part of the information as well.
[02:27:30] Sameer Kanal: Councilor Pirtle-Guiney, uh, Councilor Ryan, followed by Clerk.
[02:27:33] Dan Ryan: Thank you, Chair Kanal, and thank you, public servant panel, for being here today. It's really clear that you put a lot of time into addressing the council's concerns. So I want to thank you for that. I'm really proud of the continuous improvement that PPB has instituted since the lessons learned from, from 2020 crowd control challenges, and I'd like to hear more details about that. And you've addressed it in your presentation. Just want to give some more examples. Can the Police Bureau walk us through some of the major reforms done on handling crowd control internally since 2020?
[02:28:08] Franz Schaning: Yes.
[02:28:09] Dan Ryan: Going beyond the state law and the DOJ oversight, sat in a few of those hearings, I've listened to that. The training, just like bring us down to that concrete level of how the training is different today than it was prior.
[02:28:22] Franz Schaning: Sure, great question. And, you know, I'll start by just saying the quantity of the training is one piece. You know, prior to 2020, our rapid response team members received training usually once or twice a year on that specialized skill set. And frankly, it was frequently focused on use of force tactics, you know, tactical maneuvering, that sort of stuff. Since 2020, as we've, you know, again adopted those national standards for public order response teams, they now train once a month. So it's over 100 hours a year, closer to 120 hours a year. And the content of that training has changed dramatically. You know, we've been engaged with the Department of Justice around the settlement agreement. They required approval and oversight of lesson plans that were developed as part of that training and weighed in on that. We've had Director Rodriguez, our new director of police education, come on board in that interim. So she's also putting a lens on the training in terms of the content, adult learning practices, what is actually evidence-based learning, and making sure that those lesson plans comply with all those things. We've also leaned into community relationships and engaged community partners to bring training to our rapid response team. I can go back and pull a list of the training, but we've had community groups come in and talk about de-escalation, about emotional self-regulation. Like, in those moments, it is tense, you know, when you've got a police officer out there with a community member who is incredibly upset about the federal overreach or the police bureau's actions, whatever it is. Emotions are high in those moments. And so I think helping our officers who are put into that space be able to kind of do that self-regulation and understand where that emotion is coming from and not react to that or respond to that is helpful. Increasing the emphasis on state law, bureau policy, constitutional law, all those things. Our city attorney partners have come in and provided a lot of training, and we continue to see legislation passed since 2020. So that's a topic we always have to stay on top of. So I don't know if that answers your question. We've also, outside the training, we've looked at protective equipment. You know, how do we provide our police officers, our city employees with the equipment they need to stay safe in those moments, which in some ways increases the amount of time they can be in that space without having to use force to defend themselves. You know, we did train on public order shields, and hopefully we won't have to deploy those, you know, very frequently. But again, it It de-escalates some of these events in the sense that our employees' safety is not being directly threatened as quickly. There's not as much exigency to respond with some kind of force tool in those moments. We maybe have the time to disengage, move out of that situation if it's safe and possible to do so. And then again, leaning into those conversations around dialogue-led policing, again, the facilitation of these events, and that's more at the strategic level than the rapid response team level, but our crowd management incident command you know, when we brought Dr. Stott on board and engaged in that learning around dialogue policing, we realized that even though we were training officers in that concept, we had to align that principle across all the different levels of the organization, including our crowd management incident commanders. So we brought him in, did a workshop with our command officers, had really robust conversations around just, like, again, strategically, what's our mindset when we walk into these events? Events and try to manage them? And how do people see risk manifest or perceive these events, the level of risk involved? What is our goal out there? And our goal should really be to address objective safety concerns for community members and our city employees. And I think you've seen a shift since, you know, the spring of last year is when we had that workshop around, you know, on a Saturday morning, if you've got 5,000 people that want to come down and march through the city streets of downtown Portland to protest the federal government's action Do we really want to fight over the street and issue citations for people who do it for an unpermitted event? Probably not, right? I think the ask is, are there legitimate objective safety concerns being posed by motorists interacting with community members who are in a roadway? Those are the things we're looking at now and trying to work with, you know, the protesters or the event organizers who are willing to talk to us and work with us. How do we mitigate traffic safety concerns together? We have a lot of community volunteers who engage in corking activities. I think the question is, You know, they're not necessarily well trained or have the equipment to do traffic control the way we do. So how do we engage in conversations and potentially bolster that safety mitigation measure as opposed to, again, go to an enforcement-type tool right away? It's not to say it always works, that there's always, you know, kumbaya out there. We've had instances where we've had to have hard conversations with community volunteers who think that they're mitigating safety concerns, but they're actually creating safety concerns and sometimes still end in enforcement actions. So all those things have put us in a much better place, which I think leads to my ability to come in here with confidence and say I think it's going to be shockingly rare that we actually have to use chemical munitions in a public order setting moving forward.
[02:33:13] Dan Ryan: And I, I want to acknowledge you brought up community partners that have been involved in the training, and I've been to one— what was that called? I was there with Councilor Novick. That was a training on a Sunday. I remember in the simulation I didn't do very well. I think I was killed twice that day. But yeah, don't get stuck to this job. My point is, how can council have access to have insight and understanding of this training?
[02:33:42] Franz Schaning: So, you know, I think we would be open to what that looks like. We've certainly— our lesson plans are publicly available. We can get you guys copies of lesson plans, sort of curriculum summaries of what training looks like, what's been delivered, some of the different partnerships we've had with material coming in and being presented. And we've kicked around the idea of a community-based academy that has a public order component. Yeah. Right now it's mostly focused on patrol operations and giving you experience on what patrol officers face out there, but I think we would be open to a conversation around a public order component for that type of experience.
[02:34:17] Dan Ryan: My next question, away from crowd control but more to the dangerous tactical situations that were mentioned, which sounds like the only times that it's been deployed since the fall of 2020. How would you— how do you currently handle it? What's the process? How would that process look different if you knew that tear gas was not something that you could use? I just wanted— I know we kind of addressed I think you addressed this briefly in a big picture, but I think if you consider providing more details of recent incidents, again, not for crowd control, but since that's already been discussed, rather the tough decisions that are made when you use tear gas in an incident that is a violent incident.
[02:35:00] Derek Foxworth: Yeah, thank you for the question. Very relevant question. As I mentioned earlier, that ability to use chemical munitions in many cases is is preventing us from going to a higher level force or a lethal encounter. If we had an instance where we had a barricaded individual that we believe was armed, we're probably going to look at trying to cause significant damage to that structure. We obviously don't want to have to send employees into a situation like that if we don't have to. So we would utilize potentially pieces of armor to break a hole in the side of a structure, to break a hole through the front door, to use armor to substantially cause damage just so that we can get an eye into that structure. At some point, we would unfortunately probably have to send officers in. Earlier in the presentation, I mentioned that time and distance provide us with options and tactical advantages. We would be forcing our officers into a situation where those components are then taken away, increasing the likelihood for potentially lethal encounter.
[02:36:07] Sameer Kanal: Thank you, Councilor Ryan. Um, colleagues, we are going to end up going a couple minutes over today, just flagging that. Um, I'm going to go to Councilor Clark. I mentioned the queue is closed, so, uh, Councilor Clark, you're up.
[02:36:18] Olivia Clark: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um, thank you all very much today. I found the, um, overview really, really helpful. You put things in context for me, um, everything from the state law to what democratic socialist countries are doing with RCAs. I thought that was fascinating and really good information. Um, I also really appreciate the work that the Bureau has been doing since, uh, 2020. I had the opportunity to see the, the professor that came on deescalation. I thought it was really valuable. And, um, I think the work that thank you, Mayor. Thank you, Mayor. I really appreciate the work you're also doing on just changing the culture of the Bureau generally when it comes to RCAs. I really appreciate that. A lot of my questions have already been answered about the environmental issues. I was going to ask Matt some questions, but I'll let that go. Also, I think Councilor Ryan asked about training. I can— we can follow up. I really hope that we have an opportunity, since we don't have much time today, to have these folks back so we can dive in a little bit deeper because I have lots of other questions. And just lastly, I was going to ask, and let me just follow up on Councilor Ryan's question. Sure. The example that Officer Foxworth used about the individual in the car, I just want to ask you for another example. So if you had a home where somebody was shooting at you, the officers are outside and they're shooting at you, you know, So if you— what would you do? How would you use a chemical weapon in that situation, or how wouldn't you use it if they were banned? What would you do?
[02:37:58] Derek Foxworth: Yeah, thank you for the question. And that's something the team has faced in the past where we're taking active fire. In that situation, lethal force would be authorized. We would potentially be looking for the opportunity to take lethal force. There are instances where that's not an option because of the individual being deeply barricaded inside a structure. So we'd have no ability to degrade their ability to continue to fire at officers or those rounds going into the community. So in addition to looking at using lethal force, as I mentioned, we would also be looking at how can we create viewports into this structure.
[02:38:34] Olivia Clark: So that might be using explosive breaching, that might be using our vehicles to ram through a portion of the house, causing So if you used a chemical weapon, I guess I missed that part, how would you get that, how would you use it in that situation?
[02:38:58] Derek Foxworth: Yeah, great. Sorry, maybe I misunderstood the question. So yeah, if we had someone that was actively firing at police officers, we would be deploying chemical munitions. Generally, we'll start on the backside of a structure. Our goal is to fire at force the backside of the structure. Them to the front door where we can receive them, and we would generally start wherever they're at in the structure. So it's a coordinated deployment of those chemical munitions to gain compliance so that we don't have to rise to those other levels of force.
[02:39:24] Olivia Clark: Got you. Okay, that's really valuable. I think those examples are really helpful for us to know, especially when officers or members of the public are at risk in a situation like that. I appreciate that. I would, I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that we can bring these guys back so that we can delve a little deeper. I have more questions, but I'll let that go today. Thank you. Thank you so much.
[02:39:44] Sameer Kanal: Thank you, Councilor Clark. Yeah, I do intend to continue this item. I'm going to ask a couple of my questions, but not all of them, and then do so as I noted I would earlier. I know there's folks in the queue, and that queue will be retained, and then we'll go to public testimony. So I am next in the queue. I'm starting my timer. Just a couple quick notes. Independent Monitor LLC is the name of a company It is not actually the independent monitor under the settlement agreement. Um, it is akin to the term clean coal. Is it clean? They say so. Um, and it's also like as if Apple was a fruit company, right? Um, Independent Monitor LLC was a sole source contract chosen by the old mayor's office, uh, to review, um, the crowd control work, uh, in 2020 and provide recommendations going forward. So that was a mayor's office issue, not anything to do with police. Obviously, the subject of the review was police. I just need to get that out there. I also appreciate the acknowledgment of the harm that was caused in 2020 and to acknowledge— and the acknowledgment that PPB hasn't used these in protest suppression since 2020. That acknowledgment that it's not necessary helps us move forward because it wouldn't change any current practices there. To make a I just would like to confirm, Bureau policy and practices were mentioned in slide 1, and that includes directives and SOPs, I believe, which can be changed at any time by the Bureau without a council vote. Can I just get a confirmation on that?
[02:41:15] Franz Schaning: So Bureau policies are subject to review. We have both public review, we also have Department of Justice review and sign-off for certain policy that align— that touch the settlement agreement. So any updates to use of force policies or anything related to the settlement agreement require DOJ sign-off as well. So we can't just change them in a vacuum. There is community input, which includes— obviously you all have the ability to provide input as well. We send them out for public review before we finalize any changes. And again, there's other bodies that sign off on them.
[02:41:46] Sameer Kanal: But it's done without a public vote?
[02:41:48] Franz Schaning: Correct.
[02:41:50] Unidentified speaker: Correct.
[02:41:50] Sameer Kanal: Okay, thanks. So I wanted to focus a little bit here. If you can pull up slide 11 again. I have 3 questions I want to do today. One is that, you know, in slide— I believe it's slide 11. I think the numbers changed on it, but it's the one that has a step 1, 2, 3 at the bottom. And it refers to in step 3, which is the use of the idea that failure of steps 1 and 2 contribute to that. And in step 1, it includes prior communication between police and protest organizers. In other words, failure to have prior conversation with police as a protest organizer contributes to the determination of whether or not to use tear gas. And my question is, philosophically, why should protesters have to do dialogue with the police before they use tear gas?
[02:42:48] Franz Schaning: Yeah, I think it's a mischaracterization of what the slide shows, and then that's— if we didn't make that clear, I apologize for that. There is no requirement that you engage in any kind of conversation with the police to avoid being subject to the use of chemical munitions. I think what this shows is all of our attempts to de-escalate and manage events, and events we have done that in a number of different ways. In a proportionate and layered approach before we ever get to the point where we're deciding whether or not to use chemical munitions. Obviously, conversation, communication will always help de-escalate events, make sure there's not misunderstandings, try to see each other's viewpoints and mitigate each other's concerns or whatever it is. But at the end of the day, the failure to engage with our dialogue officers or bicycle officers does not increase your chances under bureau policy or state law of being subjected to chemical munitions.
[02:43:42] Sameer Kanal: Thank you for clarifying that. Second one's a 2-parter. It's slides 16 and 17. There are 2 quotes in here. One is police leadership warned this would necessitate higher physical force levels, and it did. That's— I think you've renumbered, or this is 14. 15, Might be 16. Yeah, it's that one. You just went by it. It's the upper right box, um, and it refers— it cites the City of Portland IPR Lessons Learned Report. I believe that is this report, and I will pass a copy to you to verify that, just to do it. I couldn't find that quote in this document, and I would love to know where you found it. And the second half of this question is in the next page. There is a reference to— in the one slide forward, please. It's the bottom left, bottom item here, the Independent Monitor's 2023 assessment. I believe that that's referring again to Independent Monitor LLC, not the Independent Monitor, which started in 2024, or the COCL, which is the previous thing. And they issued quarterly, not annual reports. I went through that, couldn't find either of those in either the first 2024 report or the COCL 2023 reports. I believe that refers to the IMLLC report, which does talk about making— rebuilding mutual aid is their first of 12 recommendations. And I just wanted to confirm that I got this right, and this will be found right before number 2.
[02:45:20] Franz Schaning: Yes.
[02:45:21] Sameer Kanal: This was recommendation number 1. If this is correct, it would come before recommendation 2, PPB must dramatically reduce its reliance on crowd dispersals with RCAs like CS gas at public order events, which along with the report that Councilor Avalos wrote when she was chair of the Citizen Review Committee, which talked about making the ban permanent, is sort of the foundation of a lot of these conversations. So I'm going to pass these around and just confirm that I can't find that quote. I'd love to know where that quote came from. Um, and I, I, I don't want— you don't have to respond to it right this second, because if you can—.
[02:45:53] Franz Schaning: Yeah.
[02:45:54] Sameer Kanal: Um, the third question— I only have 3 today— is we know— actually, I'm going to skip that one. The use of this gas, uh, in the sense that it affects not only the person it is aimed at, but other people, the school up the street, nearby individuals. The use of, of this sort of, um, material is indiscriminate, right, in the sense that it cannot target. I could not be tear gassed here without that affecting every other person in the room, but certainly my colleagues sitting next to me. Is that, is that an accurate assessment of the material?
[02:46:37] Franz Schaning: So what I would say in response to that is that the tool itself the chemical munition itself is indiscriminate. The way or manner in which we use it can be more or less indiscriminate. So if you look at, for example, how the federal government's been using chemical munitions down on the ICE facility, or frankly some of the ways we use chemical munitions in 2020, the volume and quantity of the chemical munitions created a large area where it's an indiscriminate use. I think Commander Foxworth could talk about the use of chemical munitions in a CERT setting, but that's a fairly confined area. I think the and limited use case where it— even though the tool itself is indiscriminate, the area that's being impacted is very focused based on the way it's used and, and the volume that is used. I'd say going forward, again, we've, we've increased and enhanced our ability to have focused interventions on individuals engaged in criminal conduct. I think we've increased the amount of training and also the amount of protective equipment our officers have available to them. I think even in those situations where we felt the need need to use chemical munitions in a public order setting, it would be a more focused deployment of those tools. It would not be— it would not look the same as 2020 did, and that's my true belief.
[02:47:41] Sameer Kanal: I understand that, and I appreciate the additional information there. The tool being indiscriminate is in direct conflict with that report where number 2 specifically says that PPB directives currently ban indiscriminate uses of force. So I'll I'll just stop there for now. Um, I am going to hold this over. This item is continued, it is not closed. I am retaining who is in the queue. I don't want to, um, uh, lose that. I don't want to commit to being next week because I don't want to ask you here to check your schedules. I want to ask off the desk and figure it out with you all. But in the next couple weeks, um, I'll say just based on your availability. Thank you all for being here. Um, that we're going We're going to— yeah, I'm retaining that queue. With that, I want to make sure we're getting into— I'm retaining that queue and continuing the item. Okay, I get the ones— with that, I'm going to ask if we can get into— if we can call the next item, please.
[02:48:41] Rebecca Dobert: Item 4, potential legislative items for future consideration by the Committee of the Whole, document number 2026-390.
[02:48:50] Sameer Kanal: Thank you. So I'm going to pass this over to Councilor Dunphy first, and this is a brief item just to float the ideas that you may bring to the committee in the future.
[02:48:58] Jamie Dunphy: Absolutely. Thank you, Chair. Colleagues, today I'm going to be filing an ordinance to establish a temporary 365-day moratorium on the City of Portland's procurement and implementation of artificial intelligence. My goal is to protect public privacy, security, and civil rights while the administration may the city's data and privacy office fully operable and adopts comprehensive legislative guidelines. And while this pause halts new contracts, restricts current contracts from adding additional AI functionality, and limits pilot projects to minimal risk uses, I have included clear exceptions for incidental AI features like spam filters and critical cybersecurity emergencies. Emergent AI technology carries substantial risks to both the public and the city, meaning we simply cannot go full steam ahead without establishing proper policy guardrails in city code. My staff has spent the last year trying to get more information on the structural thinking behind the current internal process, and we found that the guardrails and the access to those guidelines can be unsatisfactory considering the stakes of these choices and the vulnerability of our community members to data In fact, specifically Brenda's report earlier today on responding to immigrant refugees and this federal overreach happening in our community, this has increased those concerns for me. Additionally, by pausing now, we are intentionally aligning our efforts with the leadership of Governor Kotek and the state as they are pressing pause to contemplate statewide government usage of Frontier AI.
[02:50:30] Angelita Morillo: So.
[02:50:30] Rebecca Dobert: Thank you.
[02:50:32] Jamie Dunphy: Just a quick preview that I will be filing this, and we'll have more conversations in the near future.
[02:50:36] Sameer Kanal: Thank you, Council President. Councilor Zimmerman, do you have legislation to float, or is that a legacy item?
[02:50:40] Eric Zimmerman: That's legacy.
[02:50:42] Sameer Kanal: Thank you, Councilor Zimmerman. I, uh, will just briefly mention I am looking at bringing forward legislation alongside Councilor Avalos to preserve the right to breathe, uh, clean air free of chemical weapons usage. I'll be presenting more detail on that as we go forward, but in the interest of time, we'll, we'll just simply say it it has a part specifically banning the use of tear gas by any city agency and also working on using regulatory structures allowed under federal environmental law as it relates to the federal government's use. Rebecca, will you please call the next item?
[02:51:16] Rebecca Dobert: Item 5, public hearing on items before the Committee of the Whole, document number 2026-391.
[02:51:22] Sameer Kanal: Thank you. And I warned folks ahead of time that we wouldn't be able to get through everyone today. I will be continuing this item into another meeting as well to allow for other people to do so. Rebecca, could you please call the first panel? And as they're coming up, I'll give the—.
[02:51:35] Rebecca Dobert: Our first panel is Angie Tomlinson, Aaron Schmautz, Cherice Bock, Brian Owendoff, and Austin Pryfogle.
[02:51:47] Sameer Kanal: As folks are coming up, I'll just note that, you know, you have your 3 minutes, please use it. If you don't need it, it helps the next person go. And for those in the audience, Again, please keep your responses nonverbal. We can see what you are doing and saying and holding up. So thank you.
[02:52:01] Rebecca Dobert: Uh, Angie's online. You can unmute and go ahead, Angie.
[02:52:05] Angie Tomlinson: Thank you. Good morning, members of City Council. My name is Angie Tomlinson. I'm a stormwater scientist with a master's degree in environmental science and engineering, and I've worked in this field for more than 20 years. I've called Portland my home for decades and raised my 2 daughters here. I'm also part of the police accountability movement, and in 2020, while, while peacefully exercising my First Amendment rights, I was so I'm here today wearing 2 hats: as a scientist who understands the regulations designed to protect our waterways, and as a Portland resident who has personally experienced the consequences of tear gas being deployed on our streets. I previously worked for the City of Portland administrating the— administering the NPDES MS4 permit under federal clean water— the Federal Clean Water Act. I understand these regulations not just in theory, but from years of professional experience implementing them. Thank you. Them. I previously worked for the city of— oh, I'm sorry. And I'm here to ask straight— a straightforward question: why are we not holding the users of tear gas accountable for the environmental consequences of its use? Portland City Code Chapter 1739 regulates discharges into our storm system. Section 1739.020 addresses illicit discharges, including discharges that are not authorized under the code. Let me emphasize a fundamental our storm drains are not a dumping ground for chemicals. Consider what happens when tear gas is deployed. Chemical agents and the residues from their munitions settle into our streets, sidewalks, buildings, and soil. When those surfaces are washed down, down our rainfalls, contaminated water can flow into the storm drains and toward our waterways. We cannot simply assume those chemicals become harmless when they are diluted, and we cannot assume our stormwater infrastructure is designed to filter out chemicals. Councilmember Herbold, Portland Stormwater Code provides a framework for addressing unauthorized discharges that threaten human health, safety, or the environment. When tear gas residues or contaminated cleanup water creates such a threat, the city should investigate, determine which requirements apply, and enforce them. Now imagine a private business knowingly releasing a potential harmful chemical onto a public street, allowing it to enter the stormwater system, and leaving the city to clean up the damage. City to clean up the mess? Would we simply send the bill to the Portland taxpayers, or would we investigate, determine responsibility, require appropriate corrective action, and seek reimbursement where the law allows? Why should the answer be different when the chemical weapon is being deployed by law enforcement? Environmental regulations should not depend on who causes the pollution. Public safety operations do not eliminate the responsibility to protect the public and our natural environment. The question is not whether we can afford to hold polluters accountable. The question is whether we can afford not to. Our waterways belong to all of us. Protecting them is not optional, and accountability should not be either. Thank you.
[02:54:57] Sameer Kanal: Thank you, Angie. I'm not sure who's next, but please go ahead.
[02:55:00] Rebecca Dobert: Go ahead.
[02:55:01] Cherice Bock: Okay. Good morning, councilors. My name is Cherice Bock, and I'm here representing 350 PDX, which is a local nonprofit that organizes thousands of Portlanders who care about climate change. We advocate for the introduction and passage of a Right to Breathe Act that will protect people, wildlife, our rivers, and our rights to speech and assembly. In a personal capacity, I've been gassed with chemical weapons found in riot control agents at least a couple dozen times in the streets in 2020 to '21, as well as in the last couple years, although I missed the labor march. Other than daytime marches and demonstrations, I went out for the first time at an evening protest in 2020 with the Wall of Moms. Councilmember Herbold. Because before that, I'd been somewhat worried about large groups and COVID. But I was out there wearing a yellow shirt with hundreds of other mostly middle-aged ladies like myself. And we were gassed just for standing there, as Councilor Murillo mentioned. I was out there many times over the next year and a half, and I was just reviewing my notes from those experiences, and it was intense. I witnessed riots being declared over and over again without apparent reason. I was there. There was an extremely low threshold for declaring something a riot. I witnessed and experienced many examples of use of force by PPB and federal agents. I witnessed many people experiencing debilitating impacts of tear gas while being shoved with a crowd in areas with uneven ground and low visibility due to plumes of gas. Various chemical weapons were deployed indiscriminately on large crowds filling the streets for blocks, impacting the trees and wildlife. Councilmember Herbold. Life in the parks near the Injustice Center and at times all the way from the ICE building to Elizabeth Crothers Park. I will also mention that in my experience, protesters were always respectful of firefighters and clapped for them if they arrived, parting the crowd and following instructions without need for use of force. So arguments about fire danger are not accurate. Representing 350 PDX, I'd like to address a couple of points that were made in today's presentation, Thank you, Mayor. Thank you, Mayor. I have a few comments specific to the environmental impact. First, although it was presented that the storm drains are set up to filter out toxins, this does not address the particles that blow around on the wind. As I shared about in my presentation in August, the study of wind patterns during an evening when chemical weapons were used downtown showed that it reached the river through the air, and we can infer that it would be more likely to reach the river from the south waterfront. Second, the waterways are not the only concern. These particles also land on the these chemicals indiscriminately impact people as well as trees, plants, and soil. And third, while I appreciate the recognition that chemical weapons aren't the only ways these types of toxins enter into the waterways, that doesn't make them excusable. We don't say, well, there's already trash in the river, so we can throw more trash. No, we, we try to set various policies to eliminate trash from getting in the river in the first place. Councilor Smith. So this is not the only policy that needs to happen, but it is one policy that is needed. We should hold accountable those who emit these toxins.
[02:58:11] Sameer Kanal: Thank you. Thank you.
[02:58:13] Aaron Schmautz: Uh, thanks for having me. My name is Aaron Schmautz. I'm the president of the Portland Police Association. Prior to today, I had hoped that today's discussion would be constructively focused on the narrow uses of policing tools in response to rare but critical life safety incidents. Hard conversations rooted in truth lead to good governance. Hyperbole, juvenile social media posts, and attacks on city employees and Portlanders alike do not. I will not give more than 5 seconds of my time to such hyperbole, but 2 city council members posting on their official social media pages that Portland Police want to tell you why they should be allowed to gas you is how deeply unserious people talk about important public— important public safety matters. Thank you. For those of us who are serious about our community's safety and well-being, let's have a conversation about why sacrificing life safety and the sanctity of life to win some political points is bad public policy. As you've just heard in a comprehensive presentation prepared by international experts in policing, the City of Portland has not used chemical munitions in a protest or crowd circumstance since 2020. Since then, as we sit here today in October 2026, Our state legislature, PPB policy, and the DOJ settlement overseen by a federal judge narrowly permit its use only where life safety is at risk or in unlawfully— objectively unlawful and dangerous situations like riots, burning occupied buildings, and street brawls. Further, our CERT team narrowly and rarely uses chemical munitions to de-escalate critical incidents such as hostage scenarios and barricaded dangerous persons. These tools have saved countless lives in our city, and removing this tool altogether would put victims and suspects at unnecessary risk. Our path forward as a city is not paved. It will take all of us working together. Our members, our police officers, are your city employees, and our citizens deserve better than what we've seen from the authors of this conversation today. Our priority is community safety. Distilled, the public policy decision before you today is simple. Do we unnecessarily and brazenly risk Portlanders' life safety by banning a highly regulated policing tool to score political points? We should not.
[03:00:30] Rebecca Dobert: Brian is online. You can unmute. Go ahead, Brian. Brian Owendoff, D4.
[03:00:52] Brian Owendoff: Portland needs public safety policies grounded in evidence, accountability, and the law, not political ideology. Chemical irritants can cause serious harms, particularly when used indiscriminately or against peaceful demonstrators. Every deployment must be lawful, necessary, proportionate, and subject to immediate review. Meaningful oversight. But a categorical ban raises a critical question: will eliminating the tool Portland— make Portland safer, or will it force officers to rely on alternates that may carry their own risk of serious injury? A ban does not eliminate the need to respond when a crowd becomes violent, people are threatened, or public safety deteriorates. Depending upon the circumstances, officers may have to rely on more— on heavier issues like batons, impact physical confrontations or hands-on arrests. These alternatives also carry risk. Responsible policymaking requires comparing those risks honestly, not assuming that prohibiting one tool automatically makes every encounter safer. Second, council must respect Oregon's statutory framework. Before adopting a sweeping prohibition, you should obtain a rigorous legal analysis of the city's authority, the potential for litigation. And the practical consequences of the ordinance. Portland cannot afford another prolonged legal battle over a policy whose effectiveness has not been demonstrated. We should learn from the ongoing dispute over the restrictions on police face coverings. Passing an ordinance is not the same as ensuring it will be lawfully and effectively implemented. Third, target misconduct directly rather than confusing symbolic legislation with effective action. If federal officers violate constitutional rights, document the conduct, support appropriate litigation, and pursue enforceable remedies. If Portland officers misuse force, investigate, discipline, and hold them accountable. Protect peaceful protesters, journalists, residents, businesses, and officers alike. I urge the council to pursue a more responsible alternative. Require incident command authorization under narrowly defined circumstances. These are practical safeguards that strengthen accountability without automatically eliminating an authorized tool in every circumstance. Counselors, the test of leadership is not how many police officers It's you have on the ground, but how you use them. Not about what police tools you can prohibit. It's whether your policies actually protect the public, withstand legal scrutiny, and the work of the public safety is at stake. I urge you to reject a categorical ban unless its proponents can demonstrate that it's lawful, operationally sound, and safer than tightly controlled alternative. Portland deserves both civil liberties and public safety. We should never have to sacrifice one because our elected officials refuse to refuse listen to the facts. Thank you. To take the time to protect both. Thank you very much.
[03:03:50] Unidentified speaker: Thank you.
[03:03:52] Rebecca Dobert: Charlie Michelle-Wesley, Alex Stein, Kaleigh Roehl, Brenna Bell, Madison Moskowitz, Matthias Hallett. You can go ahead, Charlie.
[03:04:16] Charlie Michelle-Wesley: Okay, good morning. Uh, I'm Charlie Michelle Wesley, Indigenous member of Copwatch. Uh, the use of tear gas is a chemical weapon war crime. I don't care what you say. Article 33 of the Geneva Convention states no protected person may be punished for an offense he or she not personally committed. Collective penalties and all measures of intimidation or terrorism are tear gas directed at crowds is collective punishment. The tear gas definition in the presentation and the fact that tear gas is a war crime without a doubt is enough to ban tear gas on our communities. PBB says tear gas is a tool for applying indiscriminate— please look that word up— force against large groups and explain their Special Emergency Reaction Team, SERT, uses tear gas for tactical purposes. An average of 5.3 times per year. They only provided 2 examples deploying tear gas into enclosed spaces. Thankfully, the victims survived, which is not always the case. When tear gas is deployed, it is linked to excessive pain, a range of severe and chronic health issues, including a high risk of lethal respiratory failure, a slow, agonizing gasping for oxygen, and death-rattle demise. I'm sorry, I'm sorry. Then other forms of PPP deadly force. Earlier this year, Portland Police executed a warrant on Eric Scherer, a man who was suspected of suffering from mental illness. The police enforced barricades outside his apartment, busted holes in his apartment walls to send in the drones, then evacuated the floor before flooding the apartment with tear gas. When Scherer exited the apartment, the police shot him to death. Death. Tear gas as a tactic isn't as effective as PPB would like you to believe, mostly escalates situations, but they left that out of their presentation. And the terms they use, happy and peaceful, are hardly applicable. We dream of a world where excessive and indiscriminate force isn't commonplace. And in closing, the testify— and testifying as a Northwest tribal member impacted by racism and state-sanctioned police violence, police's efforts to gain respectful legitimacy demanding lethal weapons isn't going to get you there. Maybe joining us in the fight to uphold our efforts to sustain First Amendment civil and human rights and actually honor your official oath and ethics, to uphold the Bureau's values as outlined in your code of ethics, which requires officers to act courteously without fear of and safeguard the rights and lives of all individuals. We are not domestic terrorists. We are concerned community members fighting for systemic justice, community needs, and safety for all, which requires radical truth and efforts to eliminate the underlying systemic issues of racism, lack of accountability, and so-called reforms that simply justified militarized violence thank you.
[03:07:29] Rebecca Dobert: Kaleigh's online. You can unmute and go ahead, Kaleigh.
[03:07:37] Kaleigh Roehl: Good morning, council members. My name is Kaleigh Roehl. I'm a tenant in District 4, a proud union nurse that works in District 3.
[03:07:43] Dan Ryan: Councilmember Herbold.
[03:07:43] Rebecca Dobert: Thank you, Councilmember Herbold.
[03:07:43] Kaleigh Roehl: My name is Tiffany Koyama Lane, and I'm speaking today in my personal capacity as a very strong supporter of banning the deployment of tear gas in our city. As a healthcare professional, I believe our responsibility to protect the health, well-being, dignity, and safety of our community extends beyond the walls of a hospital or a care setting. It means preventing harm wherever possible and protecting our most vulnerable people. In fact, according to the American Nurses Association Code of Ethics, nurses have an ethical obligation to speak out against legislation, policies, and systemic structures that harm our patients and communities. And human flourishing and the common good. Earlier this year, I attended a Labor Against ICE rally along with members of over 30 other labor unions to speak out against the atrocities that are being committed by immigration enforcement. This was an incredible moment of solidarity for our city and highlighted the fact that all of our struggles are intertwined. As we marched together and demanded an end to ICE terror, federal agents unleashed tear gas on protesters. Order! This crowd included children, the elderly, people with chronic illnesses, and pets who all began tearing, coughing, and choking on the gas. What started as a day of unity ended as a brutal assault on peaceful protesters at a family-friendly rally that put everyone at risk. And these risks are not distributed equally. Children are still developing and have much smaller airways, and they are more susceptible to the effects of tear gas. Thank you. Older adults and people with asthma or COPD or other lung or heart diseases may be especially vulnerable. People with disabilities may have difficulty escaping a contaminated area, and pets and other animals are exposed to chemicals that they don't understand. It affects everyone and everything in its path. I was filled with anger and sadness that day, but was also so proud to see my union siblings rushing back into the gas to help people escape and provide needed aid to those that could not move. Thank you. Our community should not have to choose between exercising their rights or protecting their health. We should be able to do both. But when tear gas is launched into a crowd indiscriminately, it deters people from speaking out and demanding justice, which is probably one of the points, to be honest. Let's also not forget the elementary school across the street from the ICE facility that had to be completely relocated due to repeated use of tear gas on protesters. Despite the fact that school was not in session and kids were not present when the gas was deployed, it would blanket every surface in the surrounding area. Surrounding area. They should not have had to leave at all, and thankfully Councilor Green and his office were able to assist in their relocation. I'm asking you all to please ban the use of tear gas in our city. This is a matter of public health and protecting our First Amendment rights. The people of Portland should never have to accept chemical exposure as a price for solidarity, and chemical weapons have absolutely no place in Portland. Thank you.
[03:10:38] Charlie Michelle-Wesley: Thank you.
[03:10:39] Olivia Clark: Thank you.
[03:10:39] Sameer Kanal: Go ahead, Brenna.
[03:10:43] Rebecca Dobert: You're good to go.
[03:10:47] Madison Moskowitz: Chair Kanal, uh, councilors, my name is Madison Moskowitz and I'm testifying on behalf of REACH Community Development, one of Portland's oldest and largest affordable housing nonprofits. And if you're wondering why an affordable housing advocate is testifying today about tear gas, it's because REACH developed and operates Grace Landing, 209 affordable homes, and REACH's corporate 100 feet from the Portland ICE facility in South Waterfront. Our residents and our staff have been repeatedly teargassed by federal agents over the last 18 months, and we filed a federal lawsuit to stop it. I know City Council cannot address activity of federal agents, but it's really important that you all hear and understand what a blank check to use chemical weapons really means for Portlanders. Between June 2025 and February 2026, Councilor Smith. And even after we filed federal litigation, federal agents deployed tear gas and chemical munitions nearly 100 times outside Grays Landing. Tear gas seeped into residents' homes, forcing parents to fit gas masks for their kids to sleep in. Mm-hmm. Families slept in bathrooms to minimize their exposure. The charter school across the street closed, forcing kids at Grays Landing to commute or miss class. Veterans suffered PTSD attacks. Attacks, multiple residents have new permanent heart problems that their doctors testified in federal court under penalty of perjury were caused by prolonged exposure to tear gas. One resident lost her job because tear gas exposure caused her to need a surgery requiring a 4-month recovery. Asthma attacks became regular and more severe among residents and staff. REACH, a nonprofit spent over $600,000 on hazmat-level decontamination, supplying air purifiers and air scrubbers, and cleaning out our building's HVAC system. Our communal garden beds have fallowed for 2 summers because tomatoes do not grow when they have been tear-gassed. Kids stopped playing in the courtyard because their parents kept finding chemical residue and pepper balls. Residents and staff all know the feeling of spicy air that causes headaches and breathing difficulties. Councilor Herbold. Headaches, migraines, respiratory and gastrointestinal distress. As our lawsuit in the Ninth Circuit continues, we learn there's little clinical research as to the health effects of exposure to tear gas because it is not ethical to test or study. No one can say with certainty that tear gas is safe. One medical report, actually a footnote in the report cited by PPB in their presentation, notes that, quote, health risks to the public have led to members of the scientific community to call for restraint in the use of these crowd control chemicals. Portlanders are not enemy combatants. Tear gas is not a neutral tool. It is a chemical weapon. It drifts into bedrooms, classrooms, gardens, lungs. Graze landing is what happens when law enforcement has a blank check to gas us. Our residents and staff will carry this exposure into the years and decades to come. No one can tell us the true cost. This time, the federal government is getting the bill, but where else in our city will Portlanders bear these costs, and who will pay?
[03:13:52] Angelita Morillo: Thank you.
[03:13:53] Sameer Kanal: Thank you.
[03:13:56] Brenna Bell: My name is Brenna Bell. I'm an environmental attorney, a parent, a District 4 resident, and testifying in support of banning tear gas in Portland. In June 2020, I stood in front of the federal courthouse without a crowd or a cop in sight when the wind blew. And my eyes teared and my throat closed, and I looked around to see the source, and I saw the leaves on a tree next to me fluttering. I had been gassed by a tree. Shortly after that, my son sat down on the ground in Chapman Square and was gassed by the ground. There was so much residual poison in downtown Portland that our trees and our parks were poisoning us. This was shortly after June 2nd, which was labeled tear gas Tuesday. Thank you. Tuesday, the day that the Portland Police blanketed downtown Portland with 50 times the amount of tear gas that federal regulators consider immediately dangerous to life and health. This is a day that the Portland Police characterized the heroic actions of their officers and said that the police showed extreme restraint and only used tear gas to target specific individuals. And yes, we know that 2020 was a special time, but it's far from the only time I've been gassed by the Portland police. Over the years, I've witnessed and experienced many forms of police violence. I've been hit by a horse, pushed, pulled, pepper sprayed, tear gassed, and sound bombed. At no time was I violent, armed, or a threat to safety. Typically, I was in a crowd that was indiscriminately exposed to the use of force because that That's who the Portland Police is, and that's what the Portland Police does. Now they say this ban is not necessary. They say that there are already enough limits, and they ask us just to trust them. But what we've all seen is that the— if the Portland Police have a weapon in their arsenal, they will use it. Their overwhelming and wanton use of force in crowd management has resulted in serious injury to Portland residents, and cost the city millions of dollars in payouts. So instead of paying out after the damage occurs, why not take more steps to prevent it from happening? And to address the environmental harm from the use of tear gas, why not just ban it? Councilor Kanal's proposed policy is an opportunity for the City Council to show the people of Portland that their health and safety matters. Thank you. And I am sure that the Portland Police, who swear to protect and serve the Portland residents, can continue to find ways to fulfill this oath without the use of chemical warfare against these same residents.
[03:16:49] Sameer Kanal: Hear, hear.
[03:16:52] Rebecca Dobert: Matthias, you can go ahead online.
[03:16:56] Matthias Hallett: Portland City Council should reject a citywide tear gas ban. It can't touch the federal agents who did this year's gassing. It barely affects Portland police at protests who stopped gassing crowds in 2020. What it would hit is CERT's ability to end armed standoffs without gunfire and the mutual aid the city was told to rebuild. Council should focus on the city's more pressing issues instead of wasting valuable time on this. Thank you.
[03:17:23] Unidentified speaker: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a question for the council on this matter.
[03:17:25] Matthias Hallett: Nobody here denies that tear gas causes real harm. Grays Landing residents have taped their windows shut because of it. The question councilors should ask themselves is whether this rule actually protects people, survives in court, and works on the worst night of the year. If they're honest with themselves, this ban fails all 3. On October 14th, a unanimous 9th Circuit panel held in U.S. v. California that a state can't even require federal agents to display identification. If a state can't mandate a badge number, a city can't dictate their crowd control tools. Aimed at federal officers, this ban invites a Supremacy Clause fight the city is likely to lose. Aimed at PPD, they punish the one agency that already stopped using these. State law already bars rubber bullets remove gas, and what's left is mostly batons and hands-on arrests. No one has measured what officers would substitute, and council should not run that experiment on protesters and officers without sufficient data. Again, this would stall. This is a waste of valuable resources. Kanal's mask ordinance spent months stuck in dispute over police bargaining before passing 8-4 in council. Seattle's 2020 tear gas ban also was blocked within weeks by a federal judge overseeing its consent decree. A narrower law came more than a year later. Portland is still under its own DOJ settlement agreement. Expect a vote, a headline, and a long wait. A ban would leave federal gassing untouched, codify what PBPD already does, take a less-than-lethal tool away from CERT, and undoubtedly will stall enforcement. Thank you. Court. I urge the committee to reject this, get written analysis from the city attorney and partner agencies, and direct staff to draft limits that will actually work and survive a legal challenge.
[03:19:24] Sameer Kanal: Thank you. So we're— colleagues, we're at 12:44. I did mention that, that staff had allowed us to go through to, um, 12:45. I apologize for that going over. Over. I will ask if, with everyone's grace, if I can continue this as well over to the next time we do it. I apologize to folks who have not had a chance yet. We will retain the queue. I know, um, that that'll be in the same order as well. And I do apologize for folks that are here. That's on, on us. Um, so that'll conclude today's agenda. I did want to take a second to recognize, um, since Western Europe was mentioned, the death of Christophe M. in Paris, who, uh, was killed— a 59-year-old man, um, after inhaling chemical agents, uh, on October, uh, 19th. Uh, with that, this meeting of the Committee of the Whole is adjourned, and we're back, uh, at 2 o'clock today for City Council.
[03:20:19] Unidentified speaker: Thank you.